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International Reserves in Emerging
Market Countries: Too Much of 
a Good Thing?
WITH INTERNATIONAL reserves four times as large, in terms of their GDP,
as in the early 1990s, emerging market countries seem more protected
than ever against shocks to their current and capital accounts. Some have
argued that this buildup in reserves might be warranted as insurance
against the increased volatility of capital ﬂows associated with ﬁnancial
globalization.
1 Others view this development as the unintended conse-
quence of large current account surpluses and suggest that the level of
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1. See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2003) and Stiglitz (2006). According to a
survey of central bankers of developing and emerging market countries, the main reason
for the recent buildup in reserves was to “secure protection from volatile capital ﬂows”
(Pringle and Carver, 2005). In the words of Stiglitz (2006, p. 248) “The East Asian coun-
tries that constitute the class of ’97—the countries that learned the lessons of instability the
hard way in the crises that began in that year: have boosted their reserves in part because
they want to make sure that they won’t need to borrow from the IMF again. Others, who saw
their neighbors suffer, came to the same conclusion—it is imperative to have enough reserves
to withstand the worst of the world’s economic vicissitudes.”
2. See, for example, Summers (2006).
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 1Do emerging market countries hold too much international reserves, and
are there better ways to use those funds?
Answering these questions requires a normative benchmark for the
optimal level of reserves. I present in this paper a simple welfare-based
model of the optimal level of reserves to deal with the risk of capital
account crises or of “sudden stops” in capital flows. On the basis of this
model, I derive some formulas for the optimal level of reserves and
compare them with conventional rules of thumb, such as the Greenspan-
Guidotti rule of full coverage of short-term debt. I then calibrate the
model for emerging market countries and compare its predictions with
the actual data.
One lesson from this exercise is that the optimal level of reserves is
subject to considerable uncertainty, because it is sensitive to certain param-
eters that are difﬁcult to measure. The model nevertheless produces ranges
of plausible estimates against which the data can be compared. I ﬁnd that
it is not difﬁcult for the model to explain a reserves-GDP ratio on the
order of 10 percent for the typical emerging market country (close to the
long-run historical average), and that even higher ratios can be justiﬁed if
one assumes that reserves have a signiﬁcant role in crisis prevention. The
levels of reserves observed in many countries in the recent period, in par-
ticular in Latin America, are within the range of the model’s predictions.
Ultimately, however, the insurance model fails to account for the recent
pattern of reserves accumulation in emerging market countries. The reason
is that most of the reserves accumulation has taken place in Asian emerg-
ing market countries, where the risk of a capital account crisis seems much
too small to justify such levels of self-insurance. The insurance model can
account for the reserves accumulation observed in the Asian emerging
market countries only if one assumes that the expected cost of a capital
account crisis is unrealistically large (more than 60 percent of GDP for one
of the two major types of crisis examined).
The conclusion that most of the current buildup of reserves is not justi-
ﬁed by precautionary reasons has some implications for reserves manage-
ment. There is little reason for countries to invest these funds in the liquid
but low-yielding foreign assets in which central banks tend to invest.
Rather, reserves should be viewed as a component of domestic external
wealth that is managed by the public sector on behalf of the domestic cit-
izenry, taking full advantage of the portfolio diversiﬁcation opportunities
available abroad. Indeed, an increasing number of emerging market coun-
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 2tries are transferring a fraction of their reserves to “sovereign wealth
funds,” mandated to invest in a more diversiﬁed way and at a longer horizon
than central banks normally do. This is a trend that might take on consid-
erable importance looking forward.
The last part of the paper discusses some policy challenges and oppor-
tunities implied by the buildup in emerging market countries’ “sovereign
wealth.” I discuss, ﬁrst, the impact of sovereign wealth diversiﬁcation on
global ﬁnancial markets, and second, some ways in which this wealth
could be used in collective international arrangements—to insure against
future crises or to promote ﬁnancial development.
The Buildup in International Reserves
The growth in the international reserves of emerging market coun-
tries is striking when compared with the contemporaneous trends in
reserves in industrial countries (figure 1).
3 Whereas reserves in a group
of industrial countries have remained stable below 5 percent of GDP,
reserves in the emerging market countries have grown more than fourfold
in terms of GDP since 1990. Much of this accumulation—more than half
of the dollar amount—has taken place in Asia since the 1997–98 Asian
crisis. China now has the largest stock of international reserves in the
world, having overtaken Japan at the end of 2005, and it accounts for an
important share of the buildup in emerging market reserves. However,
China is not very different from the other Asian emerging market countries
in terms of its ratio of reserves to GDP.
This development is an important dimension of what Lawrence Sum-
mers calls the “capital flows paradox” in the current world financial sys-
tem,
4 namely, that capital is flowing upstream from developing and
emerging market countries toward the industrialized world and principally
the United States. The reserves accumulated in my sample of emerging
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3. My sample of emerging market countries is based on JP Morgan’s Emerging Mar-
kets Bond Index Global (EMBIG); my sample of industrial countries includes all countries
that were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in
1990. Appendix table A-1 lists the countries in both samples. Neither sample includes three
large reserves holders in Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.
4. Summers (2006).
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, World Development Indicators.
a. Total reserves minus gold. Countries included in each group are listed in appendix table A-1. 
















Figure 1. International Reserves in Emerging Market and Industrial Countries,
1980–2005
a
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(about 40 percent) of the U.S. current account deﬁcit in the same period
and may thus have contributed to keeping global interest rates low.
Table 1 provides some insights on whether the reserves buildup has
tended to be financed by current account surpluses or through capital
inflows. The first line of the table reports cumulative net capital inflows
as a percent of the increase in reserves over 2000–05 for the sample of
emerging market countries, with a breakdown for Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. About 40 percent of the reserves buildup has been financed by cap-
ital inflows on average. Whereas Asia has relied more than the average
on net exports to accumulate reserves, Latin America has run current
account deficits, so that its (relatively smaller) increase in reserves has
had to be financed more than one for one by capital inflows.
Another way to look at reserves is in the broader context of the coun-
try’s external balance sheet. The bottom two panels of table 1 show the
composition of the increase in both external assets and external liabilities
that were traded in the ﬁnancial accounts of emerging market countries
between 2000 and 2005. More than 60 percent of their foreign asset accu-
mulation consisted of reserves (more than 70 percent in Asia). By contrast,
Olivier Jeanne 5





Item market countries Asia Latin America
Net capital inﬂows as share of  40.6 36.6 137.0
change in reserves
Composition of the increase in 
gross foreign assets
Direct investment 8.8 5.6 20.9
Portfolio investment 8.7 8.7 13.0
Other investment 22.3 11.7 36.0
Reserve assets 60.2 73.9 30.0
Composition of the increase in 
gross foreign liabilities
Direct investment 67.9 63.3 104.0
Portfolio investment 20.9 28.2 6.8
Other investment 11.2 8.5 −10.8
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics.
a. The data come from the standard presentation of the Balance of Payments Statistics. Net capital inﬂows are computed as the
sum of the ﬁnancial account over the period 2000–05. Reserve assets include foreign exchange reserves, monetary gold, special
drawing rights, and the reserve position in the International Monetary Fund.
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liabilities accumulated by these countries.
That emerging market countries tend to have external assets that are
more liquid than their external liabilities is conﬁrmed by looking at stocks
rather than ﬂows. Figure 2 compares the external balance sheets of emerg-
ing market and industrial countries (taking the average over 2000–05),
using the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data on international invest-
ment positions. The share of reserves in gross foreign assets is almost nine
times as large in the emerging market countries as in the industrial coun-
tries, whereas the share of FDI in their liabilities is almost twice as large.
The level of reserves in emerging market countries has thus increased
since the early 1990s, but so has their trade and ﬁnancial integration—and
with it the associated risks. How much of the increase in reserves can be
explained as self-insurance in response to an increase in the hazards of
globalization?
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007














Emerging market countries Industrial countries
Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Direct investment
Other investment and derivatives
Figure 2. Composition of the Stock of Foreign Assets and Liabilities in Emerging
Market and Industrial Countries, 2000–05 Averages
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reserves by emerging market countries seems difﬁcult to explain using the
conventional rules of thumb for reserves adequacy. Figure 3 tracks three
conventional reserves adequacy ratios in emerging market countries since
1980: the ratios of reserves to imports, to short-term external debt, and to
broad money (M2).
5 Although imports and M2 have increased over time
in these countries, international reserves have increased by much more. All
three reserves adequacy ratios have increased markedly and are now much
higher than any of the conventional rules of thumb would prescribe. In
2005 reserves in emerging market countries were close to seven months of
imports and ﬁve times the level of short-term debt. That reserves deviate
even more from the Greenspan-Guidotti rule than from the three-months-of-
imports rule is surprising, since the former was developed to better capture
the risks stemming from the capital account after the crises of the 1990s.
The reserves buildup is also difﬁcult to explain using regression-based
empirical models for precautionary reserves. A large empirical litera-
ture explains the cross-country and time variation in reserves by a few key
variables: economic size of the country, current and capital account vul-
nerability, and exchange rate ﬂexibility. Recent studies ﬁnd that although
such regressions do a good job of predicting reserve holdings over a long
period, they signiﬁcantly underpredict the reserves accumulation of emerg-
ing market countries after the Asian crisis, especially in Asia.
6
It could be, however, that such regressions fail to capture the impact
that the severe capital account crises of the 1990s had on how these coun-
tries perceived the risks associated with their international ﬁnancial inte-
gration. It has been argued that the Asian crisis marked a watershed, in
that emerging market countries became painfully aware that even sound
macroeconomic policies did not insulate them from contagion and sharp
reversals in capital ﬂows. The buildup in reserves could be a rational
adaptation to this new, more volatile world.
Olivier Jeanne 7
5. The ratio of reserves to imports should equal 0.25 according to the three-months-
of-imports rule. The ratio of reserves to short-term external debt should equal 1 according
to the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, the idea being that reserves should allow a country to live
without foreign borrowing for up to one year. A conventional range for the ratio of reserves
to broad money is 5 to 20 percent. The rationale for this ratio is that broad money reﬂects a
country’s exposure to the withdrawal of assets (Calvo, 1996; De Beaufort-Wijnholds,
Onno, and Kapteyn, 2001).
6. See IMF (2003), Aizenman and Marion (2003), and Aizenman, Lee, and Rhee
(2004).
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Figure 3. Reserves Adequacy Ratios in Emerging Market Countries, 1980–2005
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the 1990s is that of a “sudden stop” in capital inflows. Figure 4 shows
that although sudden stops were not a total novelty for emerging market
countries as a whole, they were a relatively new phenomenon in Asia.
For the five Asian countries most affected by the 1997–98 crisis, further-
more, the size of the shock to the capital account and the loss of reserves
were unprecedented, in recent decades at least, as figure 5 shows. It may
not be a coincidence, from this point of view, that most of the recent
buildup in international reserves has taken place in Asia.
In sum, the recent buildup in emerging market countries’ international
reserves cannot be explained by conventional adequacy ratios or by sim-
ple linear regressions. But it may be that neither approach fully captures
how the instability of the 1990s changed the perception of risks and the
desire for insurance on the part of the countries most affected. For this rea-
son, looking at the implications of a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the optimal
level of reserves might be more informative than historical regressions.
This is the approach that I take in the rest of the paper.
Olivier Jeanne 9
Sources: Frankel and Cavallo (2004); IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Figure 4. Sudden Stops in Emerging Market Countries, 1980–2000
a
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I present in this section a simple framework for a cost-beneﬁt analysis
of the optimal level of reserves to deal with capital account crises. The
model features a small, open economy that is subject to being hit by a cap-
ital account crisis. Reserves are useful both in terms of crisis prevention
(reducing the probability of a crisis) and in terms of crisis mitigation
(reducing the welfare cost of a crisis, once it has occurred). I start with a
brief review of the literature on cost-beneﬁt analyses of international
reserves, before presenting the model.
Cost-Beneﬁt Analyses of the Optimal Level of Reserves
The idea of a cost-beneﬁt approach to the optimal level of reserves has
inspired a long line of literature that goes back to a seminal contribution
published by Robert Heller in 1966.
7 In Heller’s analysis the optimal level
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Figure 5. Yearly Changes in Reserves Ratio in Five Asian Countries, 1980–2005
a
7. Heller (1966). The dynamic aspect of the authorities’ optimization problem was
treated more rigorously in the buffer stock models of international reserves of Hamada and
Ueda (1977) and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981).
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opportunity cost and the risk of an external disequilibrium leading to a
costly adjustment—a contraction in domestic absorption. Heller simply
posited that the optimal level of reserves should minimize the sum of the
expected cost of adjustment plus the opportunity cost of reserves.
One problem with traditional models of optimal reserves is that the
objective function maximized by the authorities is only loosely related to
domestic welfare. This leaves room for ambiguity in the deﬁnition and in
the measurement of key variables of the model. First, it is not very clear
how the cost of an external disequilibrium should be measured.
8 Second,
the lack of a rigorous welfare criterion also leads to some ambiguity in the
deﬁnition of the opportunity cost of reserves, as I will show later.
I will therefore rely on a model of the optimal level of reserves that is
welfare-based but preserves some of the simplicity of the earlier litera-
ture. This section concludes with a brief summary of the main features of
my analytical framework. After reading this summary, those primarily
interested in my predictions on the optimal level of reserves can skip the
remainder of this section, which presents the model in more detail, and
proceed directly to the discussion of the numerical findings.
The model features a small, open economy that is vulnerable to 
crisis, defined as a loss of access to external credit associated with a 
fall in output. The economy is populated by a representative consumer
who holds a certain amount of foreign assets.
9 This wealth can be
invested in liquid international reserves or an illiquid asset. Reserves
yield benefits in terms of crisis prevention and crisis mitigation but entail
an opportunity cost relative to the more profitable illiquid investment.
The optimal level of reserves will depend on the following parameters of
the model:
L and ΔY, the size of the capital ﬂight and of output loss in a crisis,
respectively, expressed in terms of potential output;
Olivier Jeanne 11
8. Whereas Heller (1966) interpreted the adjustment cost as a transitory fall in domes-
tic absorption, Ben Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) and Garcia and Soto (2004) deﬁne it as a fall
in domestic output. The two are not equivalent for domestic welfare.
9. The representative-consumer assumption implies that one must look at the optimal
level of reserves from the point of view of the country as a whole, without distinguishing
between the private sector and the public sector. See, for example, Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2004) for a model of international reserves that includes a meaningful distinction
between the private sector and the government.
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σ, the relative risk aversion of the domestic consumer; and
π, the probability of a crisis (which is endogenous to the level of
reserves if they have a role in crisis prevention).
Assumptions
The model assumes a small open economy and three periods of time
t = 0, 1, 2. The last period (period 2) represents the long term. The inter-
mediate period (period 1) is the time during which a crisis could occur.
During the initial period (period 0) the country adjusts its reserves to the
risk of a crisis in period 1. This simple time structure makes it possible to
preserve the simplicity of Heller’s original approach but does not pre-
clude a more dynamic interpretation of the model, as I will show shortly.
10
At the end of period 0, a representative consumer in the small open
economy structures his or her external assets and liabilities to deal with
the risk of a crisis in period 1. To keep the problem simple, I assume that
the consumer allocates wealth net of foreign liabilities, W0, between two
assets: liquid bonds (or reserves, R0) and an illiquid asset I. This asset can
be deﬁned as a negative variable, in which case the consumer issues a
long-term external liability D =− I. The welfare of the representative con-
sumer is given by
where u( ) is an increasing and concave function of consumption, and W2
is the consumer’s net foreign wealth at the beginning of period 2. Foreign
wealth can be traded between periods at interest rate r. The consumer thus
desires a level of consumption C* in period 1 that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition,
() .
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10. Aizenman and Marion (2003) and Miller and Zhang (2006) present two-period
precautionary savings models of reserves. Caballero and Panageas (2005) and Durdu,
Mendoza, and Terrones (2007) present more dynamic precautionary savings models of
international reserves. These models do not yield closed-form solutions for the optimal
level of reserves but can be solved numerically.
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only form of wealth that can be sold in period 1. The illiquid asset cannot
be sold in period 1 but brings a higher return in the long run (period 2).
The difference between the return on the illiquid asset and the return on
reserves is the opportunity cost of reserves, the price that the consumer
must pay in order to keep wealth in liquid form.
The sequence of events and actions is as follows:
Period 0. The consumer allocates wealth net of foreign liabilities between
reserves and the illiquid asset,
Period 1. An external liability L comes due. The consumer repays L and
consumes C1 under the budget constraint,
where Y1 is domestic output, L′ is new debt issued in period 1, R = (1 + r)R0
is the stock of reserves at the beginning of the period, and R′ is the stock of
reserves at the end of the period.
Period 2. The consumer’s net foreign wealth is equal to output in period 2
plus the net return on net foreign assets,
where r is the interest rate on reserves and external liabilities between
periods, and δ is the excess return on the illiquid asset (or “illiquidity
premium”).
In period 1 the economy can be in either of two states that differ by the
level of output and the consumer’s access to external credit:
—the no-crisis state: output is at its potential, Y1 = Y, and the represen-
tative consumer has complete access to external credit (there is no
restriction on L′), or
—the crisis state: output is below potential, Y1 = Y −Δ Y, and the rep-
resentative consumer has no access to external credit in period 1
(L′ is equal to zero).
() , 51 1 1 22
2
WY r I r RL =++ ( ) + ( ) ++ ( ) ′ − ′ ( ) δ
() . 4 11 YLRCLR + ′ += ++ ′
() . 3 00 WRI =+
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capital ﬂows. As equation 4 shows, the negative impact of the fall in output
and capital inﬂows on domestic consumption can be mitigated by running
down reserves (R′=0).
11 I shall assume, as a matter of normalization, that
Y = 1, so that the output cost of a crisis ΔY and the size of the sudden stop
L are expressed in terms of potential output. I also assume that the desired
level of consumption is equal to potential output (C* = Y) so that there is
no predictable trade deﬁcit in period 1.
The ex ante probability of a crisis is denoted by π. To capture the idea
that reserves might provide a beneﬁt in terms of prevention, I assume that
the probability of crisis is a decreasing function of the ratio of reserves to
short-term debt,
where F( ) is an increasing function, and v is a measure of vulnerability to
a crisis, summarizing the fundamentals other than reserves. I will at times
refer to the coefﬁcient a as the prevention beneﬁt parameter. In calibrating
the model I will use a probit speciﬁcation, implying that F( ) is the cumu-
lative distribution of a normal function.
The interesting question is how the optimal level of reserves R depends
on the relevant determinants: the country’s vulnerability to a crisis, mea-
sured by v; the magnitude of the crisis, measured by the size of the shock
to the capital account L and of the output loss ΔY, and the opportunity cost
of reserves, δ.
The Optimal Level of Reserves
As shown in appendix B, the optimal level of reserves minimizes a loss
function that equals the opportunity cost of reserves plus the expected
welfare cost of a crisis:
() , 7 Loss =+ ( ) ( ) δπ RR f R
() , 6 π RF v a
R
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11. Note that the consumer always repays the short-term debt that is not rolled over;
that is, default is ruled out by assumption as a way of smoothing domestic consumption.
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crisis (L and ΔY) and decreasing with the level of reserves R.
Equation 7 is reminiscent of the loss function postulated in some ear-
lier cost-beneﬁt analyses of optimal reserves.
12 It captures in a simple way
the trade-off between the opportunity cost of reserves δR and their bene-
ﬁts in terms of crisis prevention π(R) and crisis mitigation f(R). It can be
interpreted, in a more dynamic context, as the average intertemporal loss
of a country maintaining a constant level of reserves R. The consumer
bears the opportunity cost δR in every period but pays the welfare cost of
a crisis with a frequency π(R). Equation 7 thus sums up the average cost
of crises and the average cost of insuring against those crises. As shown in
ﬁgure 6, for low levels of reserves the gains from increasing reserves, in
Olivier Jeanne 15








Figure 6. Total Loss and the Optimal Level of Reserves
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cost, whereas the opposite holds for high levels of reserves.
Closed-form expressions for the optimal level of reserves can be obtained
if one assumes that reserves have no benefits in terms of prevention—
that is, if π is exogenous. The first-order condition for the minimization
of the loss function in equation 7 can then be written as
where R – = L +ΔY is the “full insurance” level of reserves, that is, the mini-
mum level sufﬁcient to maintain consumption at the desired level in a cri-
sis. This condition implies that the optimal level of reserves is increasing
with the probability of a crisis and decreasing with the opportunity cost of
holding reserves—as one would expect.
If the consumer has constant relative risk aversion σ, then the optimal
level of reserves is given by the formula
In words, the optimal level of reserves is equal to short-term external debt
plus the output cost of a crisis minus a term reﬂecting the opportunity cost
of holding reserves.
Note that in this model the optimal level of reserves could be higher than
under the Greenspan-Guidotti rule (R = L), because reserves smooth the
impact on consumption of the fall in output, and not only the impact of
the debt rollover crisis. The optimal level of reserves could also be lower
than short-term debt because of the opportunity cost of holding reserves,
which the Greenspan-Guidotti rule ignores.
The optimal level of reserves does not have a closed-form expression
in the general case where the probability of a crisis is endogenous to the
level of reserves. Then the optimal level of reserves minimizes
Taking into account the benefits of crisis prevention leads to an increase
in the optimal level of reserves, other things equal. In fact—and this is































* 81 ′ −− ( ) [] =+ uC R R
δ
π
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 16an important difference from the case where the probability of a crisis is
exogenous—the optimal level of reserves may now exceed the “full insur-
ance” level R – = L +Δ Y. Crisis prevention could make it optimal for a coun-
try to hold more reserves than it is willing to spend in a crisis.
The Beneﬁts of International Reserves
I now turn to the calibration of the model, starting with the beneﬁts of
reserves. In my model reserves yield beneﬁts in terms of crisis prevention
π(R) and crisis mitigation f(R). To calibrate the model I thus try to identify
each type of beneﬁt in the data.
13
Crisis Prevention
The international financial crises of the 1990s triggered a search for
reserves adequacy ratios that would capture the vulnerability of emerg-
ing market countries’ balance sheets and capital accounts in a world with
highly mobile capital flows. The staff of the International Monetary
Fund concluded that the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt was
the “single most important indicator of reserves adequacy in countries
with significant but uncertain access to capital markets,”14 although this
ratio should be taken as only a starting point for an analysis that should
also look at other reserves adequacy ratios in light of each country’s spe-
cific conditions.
15
This view was supported by a vast body of empirical research showing
that the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt tended to perform
well as an early indicator of currency crises. By contrast, the (relatively
Olivier Jeanne 17
13. In line with the model, my discussion will focus on crisis management and will not
deal with some beneﬁts that reserves may have in noncrisis times, such as limiting
exchange rate volatility (Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci, 2004) or providing liquidity to the
foreign exchange market. Reserves can also yield beneﬁts if the government is able to
invest them more wisely than the average citizen, or if they promote capital market integra-
tion and domestic ﬁnancial development.
14. IMF (2000, p. 6).
15. Those conclusions were presented in two documents: “Debt- and Reserve-Related
Indicators of External Vulnerability” (IMF, 2000) and “Issues in Reserves Adequacy and
Management” (IMF, 2001). One study that contributed to crystallizing the ofﬁcial sector’s
conventional wisdom about the importance of this ratio was Bussière and Mulder (1999).
See also Mulder (2000).
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less conclusive, generally failing to detect a significant preventive role
for reserves.
16
In order to take a broad view of the preventive role of reserves with
respect to both currency crises and sudden stops, I ran a number of uni-
variate probit regressions using various crisis deﬁnitions and reserves ade-
quacy ratios. The regression results are based on four different deﬁnitions
of a currency crisis (denoted by CC1 to CC4) and four different deﬁnitions
of a sudden stop (denoted by SS1 to SS4). Appendix table A-2 gives these
deﬁnitions, and table A-3 lists the years when each type of crisis occurred
in each country. For the ﬁrst of the currency crisis deﬁnitions (CC1), I use
Frankel and Rose’s criterion of a nominal depreciation of the currency
of at least 25 percent relative to the previous year that is also at least a
10-percentage-point increase in the rate of depreciation.
17 The other three
deﬁnitions (CC2 to CC4) are based on a crisis pressure index that adds the
percentage nominal depreciation of the currency to the percentage loss in
foreign reserves.
18
I ﬁrst identify sudden stops as those years in which net capital inﬂows
fell by more than 5 percent of GDP (SS1). This simple criterion has been
criticized for various reasons, in particular because it captures some
episodes in which capital net inﬂows slowed down but remained positive
(such as Malaysia in 1994, following the imposition of controls on capital
inﬂows). For robustness, I also consider three sudden stop measures that
are more stringent (SS2 to SS4).
19
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
16. The literature on early warning signals and the empirical determinants of crisis 
in probit/logit regressions is too large to be reviewed here—the reader is referred to the
reviews by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo
(2005), and Frankel and Wei (2005). Another way in which reserves might stabilize the
domestic economy is by lowering the interest rate on foreign debt (Levy Yeyati, 2006).
Evidence that larger reserves decrease the sovereign spread is provided in Hauner (2005),
Dufﬁe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003), and Eichengreen and Mody (2000). By contrast
with currency crises, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) and Frankel and Cavallo (2004)
did not ﬁnd that reserves had a statistically signiﬁcant effect of reducing the probability of
sudden stops.
17. Frankel and Rose (1996).
18. Frankel and Wei (2005).
19. The precise deﬁnitions are given in table A-2 in appendix A. The crisis dates for
SS2 to SS4 are taken from Frankel and Cavallo (2004), who apply the criteria of Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) to a larger sample of countries and a longer time period.
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ious reserves adequacy ratios, crisis deﬁnitions, and probit speciﬁcations.
For each crisis definition and reserves adequacy ratio, I ran four probit
regressions of the crisis dummy variable on the lagged reserves ratio and a
constant: without ﬁxed effects, with country ﬁxed effects, with time ﬁxed
effects, and with both country and time ﬁxed effects. Since currency crises
and sudden stops each have four different deﬁnitions, each cell in the table
is based on sixteen probit regressions. The table reports the number of
regressions in which the coefﬁcient on reserves was both negative and sig-
niﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better.
Several facts stand out. First, the denominator of the reserves ade-
quacy ratio that “works” best to predict a currency crisis is short-term
debt.
20 The benefit of increasing reserves in terms of crisis prevention,
furthermore, is economically significant. To illustrate, figure 7 shows
how the probability of a crisis varies with the Greenspan-Guidotti ratio
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20. More precisely, the measure of short-term debt that works best is that from the
World Bank Global Development Finance database rather than that in the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) data. This result is surprising because the BIS data should be a
better measure of the denominator in the Greenspan-Guidotti ratio (the BIS reports debt
maturing in the following year, whereas the World Bank data are based on maturity at
issuance). However, the BIS debt measure might be less signiﬁcant because it is available
for fewer of the countries in the regressions.
Table 2. Regressions of Crisis Variables on Alternative Measures of Reserves,
1980–2000
No. of regressions achieving statistical signiﬁcance
a
Dependent variable (type of crisis)
Measure of reserves adequacy Currency crisis Sudden stop
Ratio of reserves to imports 9 1
Ratio of reserves to short-term debt 
(World Bank measure) 16 0
Ratio of reserves to short-term debt (BIS measure) 4 1
Ratio of reserves to M2 0 4
Ratio of reserves to GDP 12 1
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. For each pair of reserves adequacy measure and type of crisis, regressions were performed combining each of four crisis
definitions with one of four fixed-effects specifications (no fixed effects, country fixed effects only, time fixed effects only, and
both country and time fixed effects), for a total of sixteen regressions. Each cell of the table reports the number of regressions
out of the sixteen in which the coefficient on the indicated reserves adequacy ratio was negative and significant at the 10 per-
cent level or better.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 19R/L for values of a in the range of estimation of the probit. As the figure
shows, if a = 0.3, doubling the ratio of reserves to short-term debt from
1 to 2 reduces the probability of a crisis by almost 4 percentage points.
However, there are diminishing returns to further increasing reserves:
increasing R/L from 5 to 6 reduces the probability of crisis by less than
1 percent.
Second, the reserves adequacy ratios do not perform as well at pre-
dicting sudden stops as they do at predicting currency crises. The ratio
that works best is that based on M2, but even this ratio is significant
in only one-fourth of the regressions. This result also seems consistent
with the empirical literature, which is ambiguous with regard to the
benefits of reserves in preventing sudden stops rather than currency
crises.
One important caveat is necessary before one accepts the conclusion
that reserves help to prevent crises. The existing empirical studies do not
really distinguish between two possibilities: whether high levels of reserves
allow countries to prevent crises, or whether spending the reserves merely
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
Sources: Author’s calculations.
a. The variable a is the prevention benefit parameter, the coefficient on the Greenspan-Guidotti ratio in the crisis probability 















Figure 7. Reserves and Crisis Prevention
a
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/16/07  11:36 AM  Page 20postpones the crises.21 This identiﬁcation problem does not affect the ratio-
nale for using reserves as an early warning indicator of crisis, but it may
lead to an exaggeration of the beneﬁts of reserves in terms of crisis preven-
tion. In many cases, countries might actually have hastened the crisis, and
not reduced its probability, by trying to maintain a high level of reserves in
the face of a loss of conﬁdence in domestic policies.
Crisis Mitigation
There are two ways in which reserves can help to mitigate the impact
of a balance of payments crisis on domestic welfare. First, the reserves
can be used to mitigate the fall in domestic output. Second, the reserves
can be used to buffer the impact of the balance of payments shock on
domestic absorption.
The authorities can reduce the output cost of a crisis by using interna-
tional reserves through various channels. Foreign exchange interventions
can mitigate the depreciation of the domestic currency, and thus the dis-
ruption induced by currency mismatches in balance sheets. Reserves help
the monetary authorities in providing liquidity to the domestic ﬁnancial
markets, the banking sector, and even exporters; this is especially valuable
if there is significant dollarization of bank deposits and other domestic
liabilities.
22
As for the second beneﬁt, I present a simple accounting exercise that
shows the extent to which international reserves help smooth domestic
absorption in the face of balance of payments shocks. In a small, open
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21. This ambiguity is certainly present in the theoretical literature on crises and
reserves. In some models, a large volume of reserves effectively reduces the probability
of crisis by making the economy more resilient to adverse shocks (Chang and Velasco,
2000; Aizenman and Lee, 2005) or to self-fulfilling changes in market sentiment (Morris
and Shin, 1998). By contrast, in the Krugman-Flood-Garber framework, a speculative
attack made unavoidable by excessive money growth is merely delayed by a larger stock
of reserves (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984). In addition, countries often shorten
the maturity of their debt before a crisis, further reducing the Greenspan-Guidotti ratio
(Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001).
22. Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003) and Calvo (2006) emphasize that lending the reserves
to domestic agents is a more effective tool than foreign exchange intervention in prevent-
ing and mitigating crises. Calvo (2006) points to an interesting example of a nonstandard
way of disposing of international reserves: in August 2002 the central bank of Brazil
employed some of its international reserves to make loans to the export sector through
commercial banks.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 21economy, domestic absorption can be written as the sum of domestic out-
put, capital inﬂows, and reserves decumulation (net income from abroad
is omitted because it typically varies little in a crisis):
23
There is an exact correspondence between this decomposition and equa-
tion 4 of the model, which can be written
Thus information about the behavior of the components of equation 11
can help in calibrating the model. I now look at how the components of
equation 11 behave in observed sudden stop episodes. Sudden stops will be
identiﬁed, in my sample of emerging market countries, as a year in which
net capital inﬂows fall by more than 5 percent of GDP (deﬁnition SS1).
Figure 8 shows the average behavior of domestic absorption and the
contribution of the various components on the right-hand side of equation
11 in a ﬁve-year event window centered around a sudden stop. Real output
is normalized to 100 in the year before the sudden stop. All the variables
are converted from current dollars into constant local currency units so that
the changes in output and domestic absorption can be tracked in volume
terms.
24
A large fall in net capital inﬂows is observed in the year of the sudden
stop, amounting to almost 10 percent of the previous year’s output on aver-
age. This is not surprising, since a large fall in those inﬂows is the criterion
used to identify sudden stops. More interestingly, most of the negative
impact of the capital account reversal on domestic absorption is offset
CY LL RR
KA R
11 =+′ − ( ) − ′ − ( )                
Δ
.
() . 11 AYK A R tt t t =+ − Δ
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
23. See Jeanne and Rancière (2006). This decomposition of domestic absorption results
from two national accounting identities. First, domestic absorption (the sum of domestic pri-
vate and public consumption and investment) is the difference between real output and the
trade balance, At = Yt − TBt. Second, the balance of payments equation CAt = KAt +Δ Rt, where
CAt = TBt + ITt is the current account balance (the sum of the trade balance and income and
transfer from abroad), can be used to substitute out the trade balance from the ﬁrst identity.
24. The dollar value of output and domestic absorption falls by a larger amount than
indicated in ﬁgure 8 because of the real depreciation of the domestic currency. The vari-
ables are converted from current dollars to constant local currency units using the nominal
dollar exchange rate and the local GDP deﬂator. IMF loans are counted as a loss of reserves
rather than as capital inﬂows.
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Figure 8. Domestic Absorption, Output, Net Capital Inﬂows, and Reserves in 
Sudden Stops
a (Continued)
Sources: Author’s calculations  using data from the IMF, International Financial Statistics, and the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators.
a. A sudden stop is defined as a fall in the financial account of more than 5 percent of GDP (SS1). Events that occurred before 
1980 or within the five-year window of a previous sudden stop are excluded from the calculation. The solid line is the sample mean; 
dotted lines indicate the mean plus and minus one standard deviation. 
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3 percent of GDP on average in the year of the sudden stop—much less
than the capital inﬂows. Figure 8 also shows that the contribution of output
to the decline in domestic absorption is relatively small: real growth
merely falls to zero at the time of the sudden stop.
This evidence is consistent with the view that emerging market
countries accumulate reserves in good times so as to be able to decumulate
them, thereby smoothing domestic absorption, in response to sudden stops.
This smoothing effect is potentially large. To illustrate, if reserves accumu-
lation were equal to zero in the year of the sudden stop, domestic absorption
would fall by 9 percent of output on average instead of 3 percent, other
things equal. This counterfactual experiment should be interpreted with
caution, because the magnitude of capital ﬂight could in part be endogenous
to the fall in reserves. It does suggest, however, that foreign exchange
reserves may well make a sizable contribution to the smoothing of domes-
tic absorption in response to sudden stops.
The case of Uruguay in 2002 provides a striking illustration of the role of
reserves in a very severe sudden stop episode. Following the Argentine cri-
sis, net capital inﬂows to Uruguay fell by 26 percentage points of precrisis
GDP. The Uruguayan government used a large amount of foreign exchange
reserves (a signiﬁcant part of which was made available in the context of an
IMF arrangement) to cover the withdrawal of dollar-denominated deposits
from the domestic banking system. As a result, the decline in domestic
absorption, although quite substantial (14 percent of GDP), was much smaller
than the shock to the capital account.
The Costs of International Reserves
The cost of holding reserves is measured in the literature—as in the
model—as the difference between the return on the reserves and the return
on more proﬁtable alternative investment opportunities.
25 One term of the
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25. My discussion focuses on the opportunity cost of carrying the reserves and does not
deal with the challenges to monetary and ﬁnancial stability posed by large-scale steriliza-
tion (see Mohanty and Turner, 2006, and European Central Bank, 2006, for a discussion of
those costs). Another cost that I do not discuss is the false sense of conﬁdence that reserves
may instill in foreign investors, allowing the domestic authorities to postpone necessary
adjustments. Finally, large-scale purchases and sales of reserves could induce exchange
rate changes that cause valuation losses on the reserves.
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short-term foreign currency assets. The appropriate deﬁnition of alternative
investment opportunities, on the other hand, raises several thorny questions.
One approach is to consider higher-yielding investment opportunities
in the domestic business sector or in the building of public infrastructure.
However, the marginal product of capital is difﬁcult to measure in a way
that is comparable across a large number of countries. Caselli and Feyrer’s
recent estimates can be used to compute an average annual real return to
capital of 7.8 percent in seventeen emerging market countries in my sam-
ple.
26 This, together with an estimate for the short-term real interest rate
of 2 percent a year—roughly the average U.S. real short-term rate over
1980–2005—would lead to an opportunity cost of around 6 percent a year.
Given the difficulties involved in measuring the returns to physical
investment, most measures in the literature assume that the alternative
to holding international reserves is to invest in other financial assets or
to repay existing financial liabilities. One approach defines the opportu-
nity cost of reserves as the quasi-fiscal cost of sterilization by the cen-
tral bank, that is, the difference between the return on the central bank’s
domestic currency assets and the return on international reserves.
27 This
differential is generally positive, but in countries where domestic inter-
est rates are very low—such as China recently—this approach leads to a
negative opportunity cost of reserves.
There are two serious issues with measuring the opportunity cost of
reserves in this way. First, this measure is not adjusted for the expected
appreciation or depreciation of the domestic currency. For example, the
ﬁscal cost of reserves could be found to be negative because the domestic
currency is expected to appreciate relative to the dollar—and interest rate
parity applies—but this measure fails to take into account the expected
valuation loss on the reserves. Second, the central bank’s profit is not a
measure of domestic welfare. Selling high-yielding domestic bonds for
reserves may reduce the central bank’s ﬂow of proﬁt but increases the
income of the domestic investors who purchase the bonds. The opportu-
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
26. Caselli (2007) computes the return to capital using production functions calibrated
as in the development accounting literature. They ﬁnd that the return to capital 
is not higher in developing countries than in industrial countries once one adjusts for non-
reproducible capital (land).
27. See, for example, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), Flood and Marion (2002), and
Mohanty and Turner (2006).
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get of the country as a whole rather than that of the central bank. This
might be a reason to measure the opportunity cost of reserves by reference
to external—rather than domestic—assets and liabilities.
Reserves can be accumulated by issuing—or can be used to repay—
external debt. Given this observation, some authors measure the opportu-
nity cost as the spread between the interest rate on external debt and the
return on reserves.
28 By this measure the opportunity cost of reserves was
8.4 percent a year in emerging market countries on average in 2000–05,
but this ﬁgure masks important disparities between Asia, where the spreads
were low, and Latin America, where they were much higher (ﬁgure 9).
One might argue that these spreads overstate the true opportunity cost
of holding reserves, because they include the default risk premium on
foreign debt. As shown more formally in appendix B, the welfare-based
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28. This measure was initially proposed by Edwards (1985). It is used by Garcia and
Soto (2004) and Rodrik (2006).
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Bloomberg and IMF, International Financial Statistics.
a.  The term premium is the difference between the return on long-term dollar assets and liquid dollar assets. The spread is the
difference between the interest rate on external debt and the return on reserves.
Percent a year
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Figure 9. Alternative Measures of the Opportunity Cost of Reserves, 2000–05
a
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 27approach suggests that the default risk premium should not be included,
because it is, on average, a fair reflection of the probability of less than
full repayment. Pushed to its logical extreme, this approach suggests that
the true opportunity cost of reserves is the U.S. term premium, that is, the
opportunity cost of financing a stock of liquid dollar assets with default-
free long-term dollar debt. This would lead to a much lower measure of
the opportunity cost of reserves of at most 2.5 percent.
29
Table 3 presents some measures of the average opportunity cost of
reserves in terms of domestic GDP in my sample of emerging market
countries over the period 2000–05. The measures are based on a uniform
opportunity cost of 6 percent as well as the term premium, with and with-
out a spread. With an opportunity cost of 6 percent a year, the average cost
of reserves amounts to 1 percent of GDP.
30 The estimated cost of reserves
is signiﬁcantly lower if one considers the term premium, but larger if one
includes the emerging market spread. On average, the total cost of hold-
ing reserves was substantially lower in Latin America than in Asia if one
uses the same opportunity cost per unit of reserves for both regions, but it
was relatively similar in the two regions when one uses the term premium
plus the spread. This is explained by the fact that, whereas on average the
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
29. The differential between ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds and three-month U.S. Trea-
sury bills was almost 2.5 percentage points on average over 2000–05. Expectation-adjusted
measures lead to even lower estimates of less than 1 percentage point (Rudebusch, Sack,
and Swanson, 2007).
30. This is consistent with the estimates obtained by Rodrik (2006) and Bird and Rajan
(2003).
Table 3. Average Annual Cost of Holding Reserves, 2000–05
a
Percent of GDP
All emerging  Latin 
Assumption markets Asia America
Opportunity cost of reserves is 6 percent a year 0.93 1.29 0.65
Opportunity cost of reserves is the term premium 
(2 percent a year) 0.32 0.45 0.22
Opportunity cost of reserves is the term premium 
plus the spread on external debt  1.06 0.99 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bloomberg; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
a. The sample includes all the emerging market countries listed in appendix table A-1, except Korea and India. Data are
unweighted averages for the countries in each group. The term premium is the difference between the return on long-term dol-
lar assets and liquid dollar assets. The spread is the difference between the interest rate on external debt and the return on
reserves.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 28reserves-GDP ratio is more than twice as high for Asian countries as for
Latin American countries, the sovereign spread is substantially higher in
Latin America than in Asia.
Model Predictions
The model presented above is used here to predict the optimal level
of reserves in emerging market countries. This is done in two steps.
First, I calibrate the model by reference to an average emerging market
country, as a way of getting a broad sense of the quantitative implica-
tions of the model and their sensitivity to the parameters chosen. Sec-
ond, I calibrate the model by reference to country-specific data, to study
how far the model can go in explaining the reserves buildup in emerging
market countries.
Benchmark Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis
The benchmark calibration is based on the parameter values given in
table 4. I assume that reserves provide no beneﬁts in terms of prevention,
so that the formula in equation 9 applies. The probability of crisis was set
to the unconditional frequency of sudden stops (SS1) in my sample of
emerging market countries, which is close to 10 percent a year. The value
for the opportunity cost of reserves, δ=3 percent, is close to the middle of
the range of estimates discussed earlier. The chosen values for risk aver-
sion and its range of variation are standard in the growth and real business
cycle literature.
Capital ﬂight (L) and the output loss (ΔY) are both set to 10 percent of
GDP. These ﬁgures are in line with the behavior of capital ﬂows and of
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Table 4. Benchmark Calibration Parameters
Parameter Baseline Range
Size of sudden stop L = 0.1 [0, 0.3]
Probability of sudden stop π=0.1 [0, 0.25]
Output loss ΔY = 0.1 [0, 0.2]
Opportunity cost δ=0.03 [0.01, 0.06]
Risk aversion σ=2 [1, 10]
Prevention beneﬁt parameter a = 0 [0, 0.3]
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 29output during the sudden stops documented in ﬁgure 8.31 The output cost
ﬁgure was obtained by cumulating the average output gap in the year of a
sudden stop and the following year, under the assumption that output
would have grown at the same rate as before the crisis in the absence of a
sudden stop. An output loss of 10 percent of GDP is in the ballpark of the
estimates reported in the literature on currency crises and sudden stops.
32
The benchmark calibration implies an optimal level of reserves of
7.7 percent of GDP, or 77 percent of short-term external debt. This is
close to the ratio of reserves to GDP observed in the data on average over
1980–2000, but signiﬁcantly below the level observed in the most recent
period, especially in Asia. It would be interesting to know what changes
in the parameters are required to increase the optimal level of reserves to
something approaching the recently observed level.
Figure 10 shows the sensitivity of the optimal level of reserves to the
probability of crisis, the opportunity cost of reserves, the degree of risk
aversion, and the elasticity of the crisis probability to the level of reserves.
In each case the level of reserves computed using the sudden stop model
is contrasted with that implied by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. Several
interesting results emerge.
The optimal level of reserves is quite sensitive to the probability of cri-
sis, the opportunity cost of reserves, and the risk aversion parameter. This
offers an interesting contrast with the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, which
does not depend at all on these parameters. The optimal level of reserves
is zero if the probability of crisis falls below 5 percent, but it almost dou-
bles, from 7.7 percent to 13.3 percent of GDP, if the probability of crisis
increases from 10 percent to 20 percent. Risk aversion also has a ﬁrst-
order impact on the optimal level of reserves. A shift in the risk aversion
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
31. Using instead the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP would give similar val-
ues for L. For my sample this ratio is 8.2 percent on average over the period 1980–2000
according to the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) data set, and 11.7 per-
cent according to the BIS database.
32. Hutchison and Noy (2006) ﬁnd that the cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is
around 13 to 15 percent of GDP over a three-year period. Becker and Mauro (2006) ﬁnd an
expected output cost of 10.2 percent of GDP for currency crises and 16.5 percent of GDP
for sudden stops. On one hand, the estimated output cost of a crisis can be signiﬁcantly
larger if the output gap is cumulated until output has returned to potential, which typically
takes longer than two or three years. On the other hand, using the precrisis growth rate to
estimate postcrisis potential output may exaggerate the size of the output gap if the crisis
was preceded by an unsustainable economic boom.
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Figure 10. Sensitivity of the Optimal Level of Reserves to Changes in 
Model Parameters
a (Continued)
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Sources: Author’s calculations.
a. Dashed line indicates the optimal level of reserves using the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, assuming that short-term debt is 10 
percent of GDP.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 32parameter from 2 to 8 increases the optimal level of reserves from 7.7 per-
cent to 16.8 percent of GDP.
Figure 10 also shows that the optimal level of reserves can be signiﬁ-
cantly larger if one assumes that reserves have beneﬁts in terms of crisis
prevention (parameter a). If, in line with my univariate probit results for
currency crises, a is set between 0.2 and 0.3, then the optimal level of
reserves can reach 23 percent of GDP, about three times the optimal level
if reserves have no effectiveness at crisis prevention.
To summarize, there are two ways in which the model can potentially
explain a level of reserves of the order of magnitude currently observed
in Asia. The ﬁrst is to assume very large numbers for capital ﬂight or for
the output cost of a crisis. To illustrate, if the size of the sudden stop or
the output cost amounted to 40 percent of GDP, instead of 10 percent 
in the benchmark calibration, the model would predict an optimal level
of reserves in excess of 35 percent of GDP. Such an assumption, however,
seems out of line with the historical record on currency crises and sudden
stops. The second and perhaps more plausible way in which the model can
predict a higher level of reserves is if reserves offer substantial beneﬁts in
terms of crisis prevention.
Country Estimates
I now bring the model closer to the data by estimating the optimal level
of reserves for each emerging market country in my sample in 2000. For
each country I estimate the level of reserves that minimizes the loss func-
tion in equation 10, that is, the sum of the opportunity cost of reserves and
of the expected welfare cost of a crisis,
where i is the country index. This loss function is calibrated based on a
probit estimation of the crisis probability for each country. The model
indicates excess or insufﬁcient reserves, depending on how the optimal
level of reserves, R i *, compares with the observed level, Ri.
The ﬁrst step is to estimate the probability of a crisis for each country.
This is done by running a probit regression of the probability of crisis on
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10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 33countries over 1980–2000. The preferred speciﬁcations are reported in the
top panel of table 5 for sudden stops (deﬁned as SS1) and in the bottom
panel for currency crises (CC1). The explanatory variables have been
selected using a general-to-speciﬁc approach, starting from a set of eigh-
teen potential regressors, which are listed in table A-4 in appendix A. All
explanatory variables are lagged at least one year and are thus predeter-
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007





Type of crisis and effects effects and year
independent variable None only only effects
Crisis is sudden stop SS1
b
Real exchange rate deviation from  −1.240*** −1.295** −1.102** −1.192**
Hodrick-Prescott trend
c (0.438) (0.521) (0.442) (0.519)
GDP growth
c −2.047*** −2.028** −2.511*** −2.856***
(0.749) (0.830) (0.884) (1.038)
Ratio of foreign liabilities to money
d 0.025*** 0.031** 0.028*** 0.037***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
Ratio of current account to GDP
d −0.045** −0.053*** −0.044** −0.056***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Ratio of total public debt to GDP
d 0.544** 0.333 0.578** 0.324
(0.220) (0.415) (0.234) (0.464)
Constant −1.712*** −1.834*** −2.276*** −1.724***
(0.168) (0.495) (0.629) (0.575)
No. of observations 511 394 511 394
Pseudo-R
2 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.19
Crisis is currency crisis CC1b
Ratio of reserves to short-term debt
d −0.162** −0.261** −0.130** −0.201*
(0.065) (0.104) (0.064) (0.108)
Real exchange rate deviation from −1.441*** −1.332*** −1.598*** −1.547***
Hodrick-Prescott trend
c (0.463) (0.496) (0.504) (0.528)
Consumer price inﬂation
d 0.331** 0.134 0.392*** 0.161
(0.134) (0.210) (0.141) (0.231)
Constant −1.148*** −0.571* −2.109*** −1.019*
(0.111) (0.324) (0.404) (0.585)
No. of observations 560 483 560 483
Pseudo-R
2 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.18
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and
*10 percent level.
b. Sudden stops and currency crises are deﬁned in appendix table A-2.
c. Average of one-year and two-year lags.
d. One-year lag.
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time and country ﬁxed effects.
I ﬁnd that the main explanatory variable is the real exchange rate (or,
more precisely, its deviation from a trend), which appears with the expected
sign in both sets of probit regressions. Consistent with the univariate evi-
dence presented earlier, the ratio of reserves to short-term debt is signiﬁcant
for currency crises but not for sudden stops. The GDP growth rate, the ratio
of foreign liabilities to money (a measure of dollarization in the banking
sector), the current account, and total public debt are also signiﬁcant in the
regressions for sudden stops. Finally, the probit estimation for currency
crises ﬁnds a role for inﬂation.
Figure 11 tracks the estimated probability of crisis over time in my
sample of emerging market countries (the averages are GDP-weighted
and based on the regressions without fixed effects). The probability of
crisis is significantly lower in Asia than in the other emerging market
countries, especially at the end of the 1990s because of the weak real
exchange rates, large current account surpluses, and strong economic
growth that prevailed in that region. To illustrate, the probability of a
sudden stop is estimated at 2.7 percent in China in 2000, and that of a
currency crisis is less than 0.2 percent.
In the second step, I compute the optimal level of reserves R i * for each
country in 2000. Parameter vi, which captures the country’s intrinsic vul-
nerability to a crisis, is calibrated using the probit regression for sudden
stops reported in table 5. Capital ﬂight, the output cost of the crisis, and
the values for the opportunity cost of reserves and for the risk aversion
parameter remain the same as in the benchmark calibration (table 4).
The results of this exercise are reported in table 6. At $234 billion, the
total predicted level of reserves for all countries in the sample is signifi-
cantly below the actual level observed in 2000 (just over $650 billion).
However, the discrepancy comes mainly from the Asian countries, where
the predicted level of reserves is extremely low. The estimated optimal
level of reserves is zero in several important Asian countries (China,
Korea, and Malaysia), because the probability of a sudden stop was below
the 5 percent threshold (see figure 10). By contrast, the model works well
for Latin America, where the observed level of reserves is actually slightly
below the model prediction.
The last two columns of table 6 give the “implied” values for the risk
aversion parameter σ and the expected output loss in a crisis ΔY, that is,
Olivier Jeanne 35
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1984 1982
Sources: Author’s calculations based on model described in text.
a. Results are GDP-weighted country averages. Excludes Russia and Ukraine.  
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Figure 11. Probabilities of Currency Crises and Sudden Stops, 1980–2000
a
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explain the observed level of reserves. In Latin America the implied val-
ues are very close to those in the benchmark calibration (reflecting the
fact that the model fits the observations well in that region). By contrast,
in Asia the implied values are implausibly high—almost 12 for risk aver-
sion and more than 30 percent of GDP for the output cost of a crisis.
The results in table 6 assume that reserves have no beneﬁts in terms of
crisis prevention. As mentioned before, the optimal level of reserves may
be signiﬁcantly higher if reserves have preventive beneﬁts. Might this
explain the reserves buildup in Asia? I look into this question by estimat-
ing the beneﬁts of the reserves accumulation between 2000 and 2005 in
terms of crisis prevention. For simplicity, I assume that the welfare cost of
a crisis is equal to the output cost. Then increasing the level of reserves
from R to R′ is optimal if
that is, if the decrease in the expected output cost of a crisis exceeds the
opportunity cost of increasing reserves. To calibrate this condition, I com-
pute for each country in my sample the decrease in the crisis probability
induced by the reserves accumulation observed between 2000 and 2005,
Δπ = πi2000 −π i2005. The probabilities are estimated using the probit regres-
sion for currency crises reported in the bottom panel of table 5. The bene-
ﬁts and costs of the observed reserve accumulation are computed under
the assumption that a crisis costs 10 percent of potential output and that
the opportunity cost of reserves is 3 percent.
ππ δ ′ ( ) − ( ) [] ≥ ′ − ( ) RR Y R R Δ ,
Olivier Jeanne 37
Table 6. Actual and Model-Predicted Levels of Reserves
Predicted
Actual, 2000 benchmark
a Implied output cost 
(billions of  (billions of  Implied risk of a crisis (ΔY, 
Country group dollars) dollars) aversion (σ) percent of GDP)
All emerging market
countries 651 234 5.2 20.8
Asia 406 24 11.7 30.6
Latin America 145 153 1.9 9.6
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Level that minimizes the loss function in equation 10, calibrated using the probit estimation for sudden stops (SS1) reported
in table 5. Excludes Russia and Ukraine.
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tries as a whole as well as for Asia and Latin America separately (country
averages weighted by GDP). It appears that, on average, the cost of
reserves accumulation exceeded the beneﬁts in terms of crisis prevention
by a factor of about 3. But again the average masks an important differ-
ence between Asia, where the cost was more than five times larger than
the beneﬁt, and Latin America, where the beneﬁt of reserves accumula-
tion in terms of crisis prevention actually exceeded the cost.
The reason for this difference is that the probability of a currency crisis
was much lower in Asia than in Latin America in 2000 (see figure 11),
implying that the marginal returns to reserves accumulation in terms of cri-
sis prevention were much higher in Latin America than in Asia. To illus-
trate, in 2000 Mexico could have reduced its estimated crisis probability
from 9.6 percent to 5.6 percent by doubling its reserves. By contrast, in
China the estimated probability of crisis was 0.2 percent in 2000 and so
could not have been reduced much further. It is nevertheless in emerging
market Asia that most of the recent reserves accumulation has taken place.
Finally, the last line of table 7 reports the “implied” output loss for each
country, that is, the minimum output cost that one must assume for the
observed accumulation of reserves between 2000 and 2005 to be worth the
cost. To rationalize the reserves buildup in Asian emerging market coun-
tries, one needs to assume that the output cost of a crisis amounts to more
than 60 percent of GDP; the implied output cost is less than one-tenth that
size in Latin America.
The conclusion is that the model cannot reasonably account for the
increase in reserves in Asian emerging market countries as self-insurance
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007




Item markets Asia America
Change in ratio of reserves to GDP (percentage points) 8.7 13.8 2.8
Reduction in crisis probability (percentage points)b 2.2 1.7 2.6
Beneﬁt of reserves accumulation (percent of 2000 GDP)
c 0.22 0.17 0.26
Cost of reserves accumulation (percent of 2000 GDP)
d 0.63 1.04 0.14
Implied expected output cost of crisis (percent of GDP)
e 28.5 62.7 5.5
Source: Author’s calculations using IFS and WDI data.
a. The sample is composed of the emerging market countries listed in appendix table A-1 minus Morocco, Russia, and Ukraine.
All results are country averages weighted by 2000 GDP.
b. Estimated from the probit regression for currency crises (CC1) reported in table 5.
c. Equals the reduction in crisis probability times the output cost of a crisis (10 percent of 2000 GDP).
d. Equals the increase in reserves times the opportunity cost of reserves (3 percent).
e. Output cost that equalizes the beneﬁt of reserves accumulation and the cost of reserves accumulation.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 38against capital account crises. It can only do so by assuming that a capital
account crisis costs more than 60 percent of one year’s output, which is
out of line with the historical experience.
33
Discussion
To summarize, one justiﬁcation for emerging market countries holding
liquid international reserves is as a means of dealing with capital ﬂow
volatility and the risk of capital account crisis, but the evidence suggests
that most countries (especially in Asia) hold more international reserves
than can be justiﬁed by this objective. This raises several questions. Why
have Asian emerging market countries accumulated such large reserves?
How should those reserves be managed? And looking forward, what are
the implications of this buildup in emerging market countries’ foreign
assets for the international ﬁnancial system?
Trade Surpluses and Sovereign Wealth
Having rejected the view that the recent reserves accumulation can be
justiﬁed on a precautionary basis, one has to consider as the main alterna-
tive explanation that these reserves are the unintended consequence of
large current account surpluses.
34 The “mercantilist” variant of this view
holds that the central banks of these countries are accumulating reserves
in order to resist the appreciation of the domestic currency.
35 For this
effort not to be defeated by domestic inﬂation, it must be augmented by
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33. However, this may not be an implausible order of magnitude for the cost of a severe
banking crisis.
34. Another alternative is the view that the high-growth developing countries are
exporting their savings abroad because of a shortage of domestic assets for their residents
to invest in (Caballero, 2006). These capital outﬂows must take the form of reserves accu-
mulation if residents’ holdings of foreign assets are restricted by capital controls.
35. The nonmercantilist variant would hold that these countries’ competitiveness results
from natural factors (for example, that wages are kept low in the export sector by a reserve
army of labor migrating from the traditional sectors) rather than policy-induced distortions.
Mercantilism is at the core of the “Bretton Woods II” view (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and
Garber, 2004) of the international ﬁnancial system. Although many commentators ﬁnd this
view quite plausible, it is not obvious how to conﬁrm or reject it empirically. For example,
Aizenman and Lee (2005) ﬁnd that variables associated with the mercantilist motive (lagged
export growth and deviations from predicted purchasing power parity) explain very little of
the cross-country difference in reserves accumulation.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 39policies that repress domestic demand—for example, capital controls or
domestic ﬁnancial repression.
Table 8 shows, for the same sample of emerging market countries, the
cross-country correlations between the increase in the reserves-GDP
ratio between 2000 and 2005 and some key macroeconomic variables. It
appears that reserves accumulation is strongly correlated with the current
account surplus and not correlated at all with the change in gross external
liabilities. This suggests that, to a ﬁrst approximation, the accumulation of
reserves reﬂects net export ﬂows rather than balance sheet operations.
The change in the reserves-GDP ratio is also positively correlated with
capital account restrictions and with the real GDP growth rate.
36 The cor-
relation with capital account restrictions is the opposite of what one
would expect based on the precautionary view of reserves accumulation,
which predicts that countries with a more open capital account should
hold more precautionary reserves because they are more vulnerable to the
volatility of capital ﬂows. The positive correlation with the growth rate is
also puzzling if one thinks that high-growth developing countries should
be importing foreign capital to ﬁnance their development, but it is consis-
tent with the mercantilist view, if one thinks that undervaluation of the
domestic currency stimulates growth.
37
One could develop a cost-beneﬁt welfare analysis of a mercantilist
development strategy in the same way as I have done for the precaution-
ary view, but the trade-offs involved would be very different. On the cost
side, one would have to count the various distortions that are necessary to
repress domestic demand, as well as the valuation loss on the foreign
assets accumulated by the authorities when the inevitable real apprecia-
tion eventually takes place. The beneﬁt side would include the gains in
terms of productivity and growth from stimulating the export sector.
It is important to understand that what such a cost-benefit analysis
would endogenize is not the level of reserves R, but rather the level of total
publicly held foreign assets, which was denoted by W0 and taken as exoge-
nous in my model of reserves. Endogenizing W0 would not affect my con-
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
36. The correlation is less signiﬁcant for capital account restrictions than for the current
account balance or the growth rate, and it seems less robust—it is no longer signiﬁcant if
one uses Edwards’ (2001) measure of capital mobility rather than Chinn and Ito’s (2005).
37. As Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) have shown, high-growth developing countries
tend to export capital, a puzzle that is explained in part by reserves accumulation. See also
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian in this volume.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 41clusion that most emerging market countries in Asia have excess reserves
from the point of view of crisis insurance. Those excess reserves are
costly, first in terms of forgone returns and portfolio diversification, and
second because they generate difficulties for domestic monetary control
that can be mitigated only by introducing or maintaining costly distortions
in the domestic banking and ﬁnancial system.
The governments of emerging market countries have started to mitigate
these costs by transferring a fraction of foreign exchange reserves from the
central bank to “sovereign wealth funds.”
38 These funds are mandated to
invest in a more diversiﬁed portfolio and at a longer horizon than central
banks—not unlike the natural resource–based stabilization funds set up by
a number of commodity exporters. For example, since July 2005 a fraction
of Korea’s reserves have been managed by an independent entity, the
Korean Investment Corporation, with the aim of seeking higher yields.
China recently established the State Foreign Exchange Investment Corpo-
ration to manage reserves outside of the central bank.
According to some estimates, the holdings of sovereign wealth funds
already amount to more than $2 trillion, mostly consisting of funds derived
from oil and gas exports, but their size could increase to $12 trillion by
2015, surpassing ofﬁcial reserves within ﬁve years.
39 If those estimates are
correct, sovereign wealth funds are set to become a major force in the
international ﬁnancial system.
Portfolio Diversiﬁcation
Although, as just described, central banks in emerging market coun-
tries have recently been diversifying their allocation of reserves, this trend
has been slow, and central banks continue to allocate their portfolios in a
signiﬁcantly different manner than private investors do.40 To illustrate,
ﬁgure 12 compares the allocation of U.S. assets held by the foreign ofﬁ-
cial sector with that of foreign private investors. The foreign ofﬁcial sec-
tor invests much more in U.S. government debt and much less in equity or
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
38. See Rozanov (2005) and Johnson-Calari and Rietveld (2007). Another approach
would be to give the private sector more direct control over the allocation of the country’s
foreign assets, as in Prasad and Rajan’s (2005) proposal to set up closed-end mutual funds
that purchase reserves from the central bank and invest the proceeds abroad.
39. See Jen (2007).
40. On recent trends in reserves diversiﬁcation see Knight (2006), Woolridge (2006),
and Truman and Wong (2006).
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Figure 12. Composition of Foreign Ofﬁcial and Nonofﬁcial Holdings of 
U.S. Assets, 2005
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 43corporate debt than do private investors. Clearly there remains signiﬁcant
scope for diversiﬁcation, a trend that should be facilitated by the transfer
of emerging market countries’ reserves to sovereign wealth funds.
Some have expressed concern that the diversification of emerging
market countries’ reserves could lead to disruptions in exchange rates
and the relative prices of financial assets. To shed light on this question,
consider, for the sake of argument, the following experiment. The total
stock of foreign exchange reserves in my sample of emerging market
countries amounted to approximately $2 trillion dollars in 2005. Assume
that $1.2 trillion of this (60 percent of the total) was invested in dollar
assets, of which $900 billion was invested in the asset classes repre-
sented in figure 12.
41 Assume further that the emerging market countries
in my sample reinvest half of the assets currently invested in the official
sector’s portfolio shown in figure 12 ($450 billion) in the global finan-
cial portfolio. What would be the impact on the net supply of financial
assets for the rest of the global investor community?
Table 9 details the current structure of the global portfolio of finan-
cial assets. The table was constructed by aggregating World Bank cross-
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
41. Figure 12, which is based on data from the Treasury International Capital (TIC)
database, does not report foreign official investment in onshore or offshore dollar deposits
and repurchase agreements, which amount to about one-fourth of the total (Knight, 2006,
table 2).
Table 9. Impact of Emerging Market Reserves Diversiﬁcation on Financial 
Market Capitalization
a
United Euro  United 
Item States area Japan Kingdom
Equity
Current stock (billions of dollars) 16,800 6,000 4,200 3,000
Expected change in demand
a (percent) (+0.40) (+0.66) (+0.66) (+0.66)
Bonds
Current stock (billions of dollars) 19,800 8,400 8,700 1,000
Expected change in demand (percent) (−1.39) (+0.66) (+0.66) (+0.66)
Of which: U.S. Treasury marketable debt
Current stock (billions of dollars) 4,000
Expected change in demand (percent) (−7.1)
Source: Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, and Levine (2005) and author’s calculations.
a. Under the assumption that emerging market countries reallocate $450 billion of reserves from the ofﬁcial sector’s portfolio
given in ﬁgure 12 to the global ﬁnancial portfolio given in the table in 2005.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 44country data on stock and bond market capitalizations in the industrial
countries. The table also shows, for each asset class, the net demand from
emerging market countries that would be induced by the assumed port-
folio reallocation, as a percentage of the outstanding stock. For example,
the demand for U.S. bonds would decrease by 1.39 percent of the out-
standing stock, while the demand for Japanese equity would increase by
0.66 percent of the outstanding stock.
As one would expect, the selling pressure would play against the dollar,
especially ﬁxed-income dollar assets (net demand for U.S. equity would
actually increase with the diversiﬁcation). Net demand for U.S. assets
would decrease by 0.5 percent of the outstanding stock, while that for non-
U.S. assets would increase by 0.66 percent.
Overall, this back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the changes in
net demand would amount to relatively small fractions of the outstanding
stocks. This suggests that moderate price and exchange rate changes would
suffice to restore equilibrium. This conclusion, however, comes with
several caveats. First, the net supply exceeds 7 percent of the outstanding
stock if one restricts one’s attention to marketable U.S. Treasury debt. This
results from the fact that the foreign official sector holds a significant
fraction—about one-third—of outstanding U.S. government debt.
42 The
impact on the interest rate that the U.S. government pays on its debt might
thus be nonnegligible, depending on its substitutability with other forms of
dollar debt in the portfolios of global investors.
43
Second, the short-run price effects of portfolio diversification will
depend on the pace of the diversiﬁcation and on the reaction of private
investors. Whereas the literature on sterilized foreign exchange intervention
suggests that such interventions have moderate and transitory effects on
exchange rates, the microstructure literature shows that their impact might
be large (at least in the short run), especially in markets that lack depth and
in which information is fragmented. Furthermore, private speculation may
not be stabilizing—private investors might want to get out in front of any
government moves rather than offset them as they occur. So, although it is
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42. See Parisi-Capone and Setser (2006).
43. Warnock and Warnock (2006) ﬁnd that foreign demand for Treasury securities has
a signiﬁcant impact on Treasury yields. A study by the European Central Bank (2006) ﬁnds
that the interventions conducted by Asian central banks cannot be shown to be responsible
for the low yields in the United States, although they have certainly played a role.
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 45unlikely that large price and exchange rate adjustments must result, in the
long run, from increased diversiﬁcation of emerging market countries’ for-
eign assets, there certainly is a need for the international community to
assess and monitor the risks in the transition.
Collective Arrangements
The abundance of reserves held by emerging market countries reduces
the need for collective insurance—such as that provided by the IMF at
the global level, or by the Chiang Mai Initiative or the Latin American
Reserve Fund at the regional level. Indeed, the resources of collective
insurance arrangements have become relatively small compared with the
reserves that emerging market countries have recently accumulated. For
example, the increase in reserves in the Asian emerging market countries
over 2000–05 amounts to more than four times the IMF’s usable resources
at the end of 2005, and more than twenty times the bilateral swap agree-
ments under the Chiang Mai Initiative signed over 2001–05. The buildup
in reserves explains in part the recent decline in IMF credit outstanding,
which is likely to persist for some time.
44
Looking forward, one question is whether the large accumulated
stocks of sovereign wealth could be used to collectively insure risks
other than capital account crises. Emerging market countries face other
risks that are now largely uninsured, such as natural disasters, epidemics,
terms of trade shocks, and severe output drops.
45 Although some of these
risks may be uninsurable because of the potential for moral hazard, there
might be scope for expanding insurance through appropriate collective inter-
vention at the regional or the global level.
Finally, sovereign wealth can be used to induce the development of
regional ﬁnancial markets. An example of this is the Asian Bond Fund, cre-
ated in 2003 to diversify the investment of Asian central banks’ reserves
away from U.S. and European securities into Asian bonds. Since 2005 the
Asian Bond Fund has also invested in domestic currency bonds issued by
46 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
44. Using various models of the demand for IMF loans, Ghosh and others (2007) pro-
ject that IMF credit outstanding will decline from an average of SDR 50 billion over
2000–05 to SDR 8 billion over 2006–10, in part because of the increase in the reserves-to-
short-term-debt ratio in emerging market countries.
45. See Becker and others (2007).
10657-01a_Jeanne.qxd  8/15/07  10:11 AM  Page 46regional sovereign issuers, as a catalyst for private investment in Asian
issues.
46 Such initiatives might enable emerging market countries to
develop debt instruments (with long maturities and domestic currency
denomination) that are safer for their borrowers.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has argued that reserves accumulation in Asian emerging
market countries is difﬁcult to justify—at least since 2000—in terms of
self-insurance against capital ﬂow volatility and capital account crises.
The main piece of evidence behind this claim is the failure of a simple
cost-beneﬁt model of optimal reserves to account for the reserves buildup
in these countries since 2000: their vulnerability to a capital account crisis
was too low in that year to justify the cost of the accumulated reserves.
That reserves were excessive from the point of view of crisis insurance is
also suggested by recent moves to reallocate reserves from central banks
to sovereign wealth funds investing in less liquid, higher-yielding assets.
Even if the rate of accumulation of reserves were to abate—and
notwithstanding the good reasons that it should—the public sectors of a
number of emerging market countries, especially in Asia, will have to
manage stocks of foreign ﬁnancial assets of unprecedented size for some
time to come. This generates both policy challenges and opportunities for
the international community. One challenge is to ensure that the diversiﬁ-
cation of those assets is conducted in an orderly manner, to avoid large or
abrupt changes in the relative prices of ﬁnancial assets or in exchange
rates. An opportunity lies in the fact that this increase in sovereign wealth
could provide the basis for cross-country insurance arrangements against
risks other than capital account crises, or could catalyze regional ﬁnancial
development.
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46. Eichengreen (2006) recommends that the Latin American Reserve Fund follow a
similar course of action.
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Data and Deﬁnitions
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
Table A-1. Countries in the Sample
Emerging market countriesa Industrial countriesb
Argentina Mexico Australia Norway
Brazil Morocco Austria Portugal
Bulgaria Nigeria Belgium Spain
Chile Pakistan Canada Sweden
China Panama Denmark Switzerland
Colombia Peru Finland United Kingdom
Côte d’Ivoire Philippines France United States
Dominican Republic Poland Germany
Ecuador Russia Greece
Egypt South Africa Iceland





Malaysia Venezuela New Zealand
a. All countries in the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) as of August 31, 2005, excluding Serbia and
Montenegro and Lebanon because of data availability, and adding India and Korea.
b. Countries that were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1990 and are not in the list
of emerging market countries.
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Table A-2. Crisis Deﬁnitions











a. Net capital inﬂows are measured as the sum of the capital and ﬁnancial account plus net errors and omissions minus reserve




















A nominal depreciation of the currency of at
least 25 percent relative to the previous year
that is also at least a 10 percent acceleration,
year over year, in the rate of depreciation.
A year is identiﬁed as a crisis year if, in at least
one month, the sum of the monthly percentage
nominal depreciation and the percentage loss
in foreign reserves exceeds 15. The sum of 
the percentage nominal depreciation and the
percentage loss in reserves must also be 
10 percentage points greater than in the
previous month. In cases where successive
years may satisfy the crisis criterion, only 
the ﬁrst year of crisis is counted within any
three-year window.
Same as CC2 except that the sum of the
percentage nominal depreciation and the
percentage loss of foreign reserves must
exceed 25.
Same as CC2 except that the sum of the
percentage nominal depreciation and the
percentage loss of foreign reserves must
exceed 35.
The ratio of net capital inﬂows
a to GDP falls by
more than 5 percent relative to the previous
year.
A reduction in the ﬁnancial account from a
surplus position with respect to the previous
year that is 2 standard deviations above the
mean standard deviation (the average of
standard deviations of the ﬁnancial account
over the entire sample). A fall in GDP per
capita and in the current account deﬁcit must
accompany the ﬁnancial account reduction,
during either the same year or the next year.
Same as SS2 except that the mean standard
deviation of the ﬁnancial account is that over
the corresponding decade only.
Same as SS2 except that the mean standard
deviation is computed for the year-to-year
change in the ﬁnancial account rather than the
level.
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Table A-4. Variables Considered in the Probit Analysis
Variablea Sourceb
Annual growth in GDP WDI




Ratio of lagged real public debt to real GDP GDF, WDI
Ratio of lagged short-term debt to real GDP GDF, WDI
Exchange rate
Second lag of exchange rate regime dummies Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Lagged real effective exchange rate deviation 
from Hodrick-Prescott trend IFS
Trade
Ratio of lagged sum of exports and imports 
to GDP WDI
Lagged growth in terms of trade (percent) IFS
Index of current account openness Quinn (2000)
U.S. interest rates
Interest rate on Treasury bills (percent a year) IFS
Change in the interest rate on Treasury bills 
(basis points) IFS
Business cycle indicators
Average of ﬁrst and second lags of real 
GDP growth WDI
Financial account openness
Ratio of lagged absolute gross inﬂows to GDP IFS
Ratio of lagged sum of absolute gross inﬂows 
and absolute gross outﬂows to GDP IFS
Stocks of foreign assets and foreign liabilities
Ratio of lagged net foreign assets to GDP Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
Ratio of lagged stock of foreign liabilities to GDP Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
Ratio of stock of debt liabilities to stock of  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
total liabilities
Ratio of lagged stock of FDI to stock of 
total liabilities Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
Other
Ratio of foreign liabilities to money in the 
ﬁnancial sector IFS
Consumer price inﬂation (percent a year) IFS
a. Lags are one-year lags except where stated otherwise.
b. Deﬁnitions: GDF, Global Development Finance (World Bank); IFS, International Financial Statistics (IMF); WDI, World
Development Indicators (World Bank).
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Solving for the Optimal Level of Reserves
RESERVES MANAGEMENT IN A CRISIS. How does the country in the model
use its reserves in period 1? If there is no crisis, the consumer achieves
the desired level of consumption C* and saves any residual wealth
(which could be positive or negative) as net reserves. But if there is a cri-
sis, the consumer may be unable to consume C*. Then, using equation 4
in the text, Y1 = Y −Δ Y, and L′=0, period-1 consumption is given by
The question is whether the consumer can achieve the desired level of
consumption C1 = C* by running down reserves (R′=0). This is the case
if reserves R exceed the following threshold:
R – is the “full insurance” level of reserves, that is, the amount that allows
the consumer to maintain consumption as if there were no crisis. It is also
the maximum amount of reserves that the consumer is ready to spend in a
crisis. The “full insurance” level of reserves is equal to the sum of the cap-
ital outﬂow and output fall in a crisis, plus the period-1 trade deﬁcit. The
last term is equal to zero because of the assumption that C* = Y.
THE LOSS FUNCTION (EQUATION 7). Period-0 welfare is given by
where U
n
1 is the welfare level conditional on no crisis, and U
c
1 is that con-




1 is the welfare cost of a crisis. Using
equations 3 and 4 to substitute out I and R′−L′ from equation 5, we can
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C* = Y, so that welfare is given by
where U – is the consumer’s ex ante welfare if there is no crisis risk and W0
is invested in the illiquid asset. By contrast, if there is a crisis, Y1 = Y −Δ Y
and R′=0 (assuming R ≤ R –), so that C1 = Y −Δ Y − L + R = C* − (R – − R),
implying a welfare level of




1 = f(R), with
(if R ≤ R –). The welfare cost of a crisis is the sum of two components: the
output cost of the crisis and the cost of distorting the path of domestic
consumption away from the unconstrained equilibrium. The second com-
ponent, which is decreasing with R and equal to zero if R ≥ R –, captures the
beneﬁt of reserves in terms of crisis mitigation in my model. Finally,
period-0 welfare can be written
An Extension with Debt and Default
Assume that reserves are ﬁnanced by long-term debt D =− I, and assume
W0 = 0, so that R = D. There is no need to assume that debt is illiquid in the
same sense as the physical investment—the debt could be traded in a liq-
uid market. What is important for my results is that I cannot be decreased
(or, equivalently, D cannot be increased) in a crisis. For debt this is an
implication of the credit constraint to which the consumer is subject during
a crisis.
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probability μ and therefore pays a risk premium [1/(1 − μ)] − 1. Then the
expression for ﬁnal wealth (equation 5) is
where η takes the value of 1 if the consumer repays the debt and 0 if not.





1, are the same as before. Hence the default probability μ has
no impact on the optimal level of reserves; only δ should be counted in
the opportunity cost of reserves.
However, the risk of default could be relevant if there are default costs.
Assume that Y2 is stochastic and default occurs only if the debt repayment
exceeds the cost of default γY2. Then, given D = R, the probability of
default μ is endogenous and is solved by
This equation implicitly deﬁnes a default threshold Y –(R) that is increasing
with R. The ex ante loss becomes
The opportunity cost of reserves includes a term for the deadweight cost
of default, which is increasing with reserves. This term is not the same as
the default risk premium, [1/(1 − μ)] − 1.
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Comments and 
Discussion
Joshua Aizenman: Since the 1980s, the world economy has witnessed an
intriguing development: despite the proliferation of more ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes, ratios of international reserves to GDP have increased substan-
tially, and practically all of that increase has taken place in developing coun-
tries, mostly in East Asia. This puzzling phenomenon has stirred a lively
debate among economists and ﬁnancial observers, and several interpreta-
tions have been offered. These focus on the observation that the deeper
ﬁnancial integration of developing countries into the global economy has
increased their exposure to volatile short-term ﬂows of capital (dubbed “hot
money”), which are subject to costly and frequent sudden stops and rever-
sals.
1 In these circumstances, hoarding international reserves can be viewed
as a precautionary adjustment, reﬂecting the desire for self-insurance against
exposure to future sudden stops, currency crises, and capital ﬂight.
2
In this paper, Olivier Jeanne appraises the explanatory power of self-
insurance models of international reserves. He provides a careful formula-
tion of a utility-based welfare analysis of optimal hoarding of international
reserves, and a calibration that allows one to evaluate the degree to which
recent hoarding trends are consistent with the model’s predictions. The
framework is based on an elegant model, providing strong predictions
about optimal usable reserves in the context of self-insurance against sud-
den stops and currency crises. Applying the model to the data produces
some intriguing results: for the typical emerging market country, the model
1. See, for example, Calvo (1998) and Edwards (2004).
2. See Flood and Marion (2002) for an overview of the literature explaining interna-
tional reserves applying the buffer stock approach. See Ben Bassat and Gottlieb (1992),
Aizenman and Marion (2003), Lee (2004), Aizenman and Lee (2005), Garcia and Soto
(2004), Jeanne and Rancière (2006), and Rodrik (2006) for precautionary and self-insurance
models of international reserves hoarding. 
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can plausibly explain a reserves-GDP ratio on the order of 10 percent, close
to the long-run historical average, and it can justify even higher levels if one
assumes that reserves have a signiﬁcant role in terms of crisis prevention.
The levels of reserves recently observed in many countries, in particular in
Latin America, are within the range of the model’s predictions. For emerg-
ing market countries in the aggregate, however, the insurance model fails to
account for the recent reserves buildup, because the risk of a capital account
crisis in the Asian countries where most of the buildup has taken place
seems much too small to justify such levels of self-insurance.
Jeanne’s paper is an important and timely contribution to the debate
about the relative costs and beneﬁts of hoarding reserves. Yet his results
raise the question of what factors might account for the sizable gaps
between the model’s predictions and the actual hoarding of reserves
observed during recent years. After brieﬂy summarizing his methodology
and key results, I will discuss several alternative interpretations of reserves
hoarding during the 2000s that go beyond the self-insurance paradigm, and
I will offer several extensions that may improve the explanatory power of
Jeanne’s model.
THE MODEL AND ITS CALIBRATION. Jeanne’s framework explains hoard-
ing of international reserves in the context of a small open economy popu-
lated by a representative consumer and exposed to crises triggered by a loss
of access to external credit, possibly associated with a fall in output. The
model has three periods. The focus of the analysis is on the optimal hoarding
of net reserves in period 0, when the representative consumer anticipates the
possibility of a sudden stop and a costly foreign currency crisis in period 1.
The consumer’s welfare is the sum of the expected utility of consumption in
period 1 plus discounted expected (terminal) wealth in period 2.
Within this framework, Jeanne provides a carefully worked-out model
in which international reserves affect welfare in two distinct ways. The
ﬁrst is through crisis prevention: an increase in reserves may reduce the
probability of a crisis and thus directly reduce the expected output cost.
The second is through crisis mitigation: reserves may reduce the cost of
smoothing consumption during a crisis. In this model optimal international
reserves are shown to be determined by minimizing a loss function, where
the total loss equals the sum of the opportunity cost of reserves and the
expected welfare cost of a crisis. 
The model is calibrated in two steps. First, using multivariate probit
regressions on data for a group of emerging market countries from 1980 to
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Next he computes the optimal level of reserves that minimizes the loss
function. He ﬁnds that the predicted level of optimal reserves in 2000 across
all countries in the sample is about $235 billion, or about 35 percent of the
actual level observed (close to $650 billion). The discrepancy comes
mainly from the Asian countries, where the predicted level of reserves is
extremely low, reﬂecting a very low estimated probability of a sudden stop.
By contrast, the model works well for Latin America, where the observed
level of reserves is actually slightly below the model’s prediction. 
Next Jeanne estimates the beneﬁts of the reserves accumulation
between 2000 and 2005 in terms of crisis prevention, assuming that the
welfare cost of a crisis is equal to the output cost. The results are striking:
on average, the cost of reserves accumulation exceeds the beneﬁts in terms
of currency crisis prevention by a factor of three. This average aggregates
the differences between Asia, where the cost was more than ﬁve times
larger than the beneﬁt, and Latin America, where the beneﬁt actually
exceeded the cost. These differences reﬂect the much lower probability of
a currency crisis in Asia than in Latin America in 2000, implying that the
marginal returns to reserves accumulation in terms of crisis prevention
were much higher in Latin America. Applying the model, one can con-
clude that, to rationalize the reserves buildup in Asian countries, one needs
to assume that the expected output cost of a currency crisis in Asia
amounts to more than 60 percent of GDP, more than ten times the corre-
sponding cost in Latin America.
Jeanne discusses possible interpretations for this puzzle. The ﬁrst candi-
date is mercantilism, in which hoarding of international reserves is aimed at
keeping the domestic currency undervalued, as part of an export-led growth
strategy.
3 Jeanne points out the theoretical and empirical challenges
involved in modeling and testing this hypothesis. He also reports an inter-
esting observation: the change in the reserves-GDP ratio is positively corre-
lated with capital account restrictions. This correlation is the opposite of
what one would expect based on the precautionary view of reserves accu-
mulation, which predicts that countries with a more open capital account
should hold more precautionary reserves because they are more vulnerable
to volatile capital ﬂows. In the next section I will show that this ﬁnding is
consistent with the outcome of a competitive hoarding game. 
58 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
3. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004).
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cates that reserves accumulation is strongly correlated with the current
account surplus and not correlated at all with the change in gross external
liabilities. This suggests that, to a ﬁrst approximation, the accumulation of
reserves reﬂects net export ﬂows rather than balance sheet operations. The
change in the reserves-GDP ratio is also positively correlated with the
real GDP growth rate. This is puzzling if one thinks that high-growth
developing countries should be importing foreign capital to finance their
development. Yet this correlation is only one piece of a complex puzzle
reported elsewhere by Jeanne himself with Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas:
rapidly growing developing countries tend to export capital, an enigma
that is explained in part by reserves accumulation.
4
Jeanne closes the paper with a discussion of several policy implications.
The governments of emerging market countries have started to mitigate
the opportunity costs of hoarding large reserves by transferring a fraction
of their foreign exchange reserves from the central bank to sovereign
wealth funds. These funds are mandated to invest in a more diversiﬁed
portfolio and at a longer horizon than central banks normally do, and they
frequently are managed by quasi-independent entities (such as the recently
established Korean Investment Corporation and the Chinese State Foreign
Exchange Investment Corporation, as well as some older funds including
Norway’s oil fund). The assets of these sovereign wealth funds amount to
about $2 trillion today and are projected to increase rapidly in the future,
becoming a major force in the international ﬁnancial system. Jeanne con-
siders the possible impact of portfolio diversiﬁcation following attempts
by these entities to scale down the dollar share of their international
reserves. He ﬁnds that the impact of a gradual diversiﬁcation would be
moderate, decreasing net demand for U.S. assets by an estimated 0.5 per-
cent of the outstanding stock, while the net demand for non-U.S. assets
would increase by 0.66 percent of the stock.
5
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4. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). See Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2007) and
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (this volume) for further ﬁndings and interpretations of the
positive association between economic growth and current account surpluses.
5. The impact would be larger if the substitutability between dollar debt and other cur-
rency debt is low, as international reserves diversiﬁcation by major central banks may
imply a net supply exceeding 7 percent of the outstanding stock if one restricts attention to
marketable U.S. Treasury debt (reﬂecting the fact that the foreign ofﬁcial sector holds
about one-third of the outstanding U.S. government debt). 
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ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RECENT RESERVES HOARDING.I
now turn to some possible interpretations of the puzzle that Jeanne has
identiﬁed. My starting point applies the logic of revealed preferences to
argue that the continued large hoarding of international reserves by devel-
oping countries must reﬂect systemic forces supporting this trend. The
challenge is to identify those forces and the conditions that may induce
changes in the observed patterns. This requires venturing beyond the
domain of the representative agent paradigm and entails some conjectures
that deserve a more careful evaluation. 
Competitive hoarding. The view that ascribes the large increase in
hoarding of reserves to self-insurance faces a well-known challenger in a
modern incarnation of mercantilism: the view that reserves accumulation
is triggered by concerns about export competitiveness. This explanation
has been advanced by Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter
Garber, especially in the context of Asia.
6 They interpret reserves accumu-
lation as a by-product of export promotion, undertaken in Asia’s case as a
means of absorbing abundant labor migrating from the traditional sectors,
especially agriculture. Although intellectually intriguing, this interpreta-
tion remains debatable. Some have pointed out that strong export growth
in East Asia is nothing new—indeed, it is an important part of the story
there since the 1950s. Yet the large increase in reserves has happened
mostly since 1997. Jaewoo Lee and I tested the importance of precaution-
ary and mercantilist motives in accounting for the hoarding of interna-
tional reserves by developing countries during 1980–2000.
7 Although we
found that certain variables associated with the mercantilist motive (such
as lagged export growth and deviation of exchange rates from purchasing
power parity) are statistically signiﬁcant, their economic importance is
small and dwarfed by other variables. Overall, our empirical results were
consistent with an explanation based on precautionary demand. The inabil-
ity of empirical research to validate a robust economic role for mercantilist
hoarding through its impact on the real exchange rate, together with the
acceleration of large hoardings in East Asia during 2001–07, remains a
puzzle. 
Arguably, one might reconcile the mercantilist view with the limited
support of mercantilism found in cross-country regressions by invoking
6. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004). 
7. Aizenman and Lee (2005).
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the concept of competitive hoarding by countries following an export-
oriented growth strategy and competing with each other in the same third
markets, such as the United States. Such hoarding might be triggered by
more vigorous competition in industries approaching excess capacity. My
ﬁgure 1 depicts an example of such a competitive hoarding game, one akin
to Harry Johnson’s classic tariff war model.
8
The ﬁgure illustrates the behavior of two emerging market countries, H
and F, exporting similar products to a third market. Increased hoarding of
reserves by either country would depreciate its currency, thereby improv-
ing its export competitiveness vis-à-vis the other country. Assume that
both H and F seek to balance the gain from export promotion against the
costs of hoarding reserves (reﬂecting costly sterilization and other indirect
costs). The optimal international reserves level in the absence of competi-
tive hoarding is normalized to 1, given by point O. Curves HH and FF are
the reaction functions of H and F in the competitive hoarding game. Curve
Wo is H’s indifference curve, consisting of conﬁgurations of domestic and
foreign reserves where H’s utility equals the benchmark of no competitive
hoarding. H is worse off relative to the no-hoarding equilibrium at points
above curve Wo. The Nash equilibrium of the competitive hoarding game
is depicted by the intersection of curves HH and FF, at point S. When the
two emerging market countries have symmetric costs associated with
hoarding reserves (top panel), competitive hoarding tends to dissipate most
of the competitiveness gains, leading to self-defeating (“beggar-yourself”)
outcomes and excessive hoarding. If, however, the countries have asym-
metric costs of accumulating reserves (bottom panel), a country with a low
enough cost of sterilization may win the hoarding war: its noncooperative
outcome, which lies below the curve Wo, is superior to the cooperative
one, in a manner akin to the “beggar-thy-neighbor” outcome of asymmet-
ric tariff wars.
9
Financial repression of the type observed in China may reduce its steril-
ization costs, thereby increasing the aggressiveness of its sterilization and
ultimately increasing its international reserves. Consequently, competitive
hoarding in circumstances where ﬁnancial repression reduces the cost of
sterilization is consistent with Jeanne’s ﬁnding of a negative association
between hoarding and ﬁnancial integration. 
8. Johnson (1953).
9. Aizenman and Lee (2006).












Source: Aizenman and Lee (2006).
a. The “beggar-yourself” case; the home country (H) and the foreign country (F) have the same sterilization costs.
b. The optimal level of reserves is normalized to one unit.
c. The “beggar-thy-neighbor” case; H has lower sterilization costs than F.  












Figure 1. Two Cases of Competitive Hoarding in Two Emerging Market Countries
Arguably, the unique role of China in a hoarding game is consistent
with recent patterns of sterilization. The accumulation of international
reserves accelerated during 2000–05 to more than $100 billion annually on
average and has been associated with sizable current account surpluses and
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Reuven Glick and I also found a signiﬁcant increase in the coefﬁcient of
sterilization following the 1997–98 crisis, a trend that continues today and
applies well beyond Asia.
11 These ﬁndings suggest that growing ﬁnancial
integration has been associated with extensive hoarding of international
reserves. Notwithstanding concerns about sterilization costs, reserves
hoarding and sterilization have complemented each other during the last
ten years, as developing countries have increased the intensity of both. The
costs of sterilization have so far been well below the perceived beneﬁts of
monetary stability and the wish to hoard international reserves.
These trends are consistent with aggressive sterilization applied by
China, where large inﬂows of capital and large current account surpluses
are associated with sterilization. If China’s sterilization costs are lower
than those of Korea and other countries competing with China in the U.S.
market, China may ultimately win the hoarding game. China’s sheer size
and low sterilization costs, probably due to ﬁnancial repression there, may
force Korea and Japan to keep hoarding international reserves in order to
prevent deeper erosion of their competitiveness.
12
Such behavior may also explain the inability to find empirical evi-
dence of a robust economic role for the mercantilist approach, as most
of the effects tend to dissipate quickly. Competitive hoarding may also
reflect coordination failure. If China is the winner by virtue of its low
sterilization costs and size, other Asian countries may be made worse
off (while, arguably, the welfare impact of the hoarding game on the
United States is ambiguous). It also suggests the possibility of gains
from regional coordination, possibly in the form of a regional fund,
although China may be less eager than other East Asian countries to
participate in such a fund. Competitive hoarding is also consistent with
the possibility that demand for international reserves is interdependent,
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10. These averages mask the remarkable acceleration of China’s annual hoardings,
from close to zero during 2000, to about $100 billion, $200 billion, and $250 billion during
2003, 2004, and 2006, respectively. 
11. Aizenman and Glick (2007). The “coefﬁcient of sterilization” measures the mar-
ginal change of domestic credit associated with hoarding international reserves. Speciﬁ-
cally, we regress the four-quarter change in net domestic assets on the four-quarter increase
in net foreign assets held by the central bank, scaled by reserve money stock, controlling
for nominal GDP growth.
12. Arguably, it may also induce Korea and Japan to invest directly in China, in an
attempt to minimize their losses in the hoarding game. 
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as XingWang Qian reported in a study of ten East Asian economies.13
They found, controlling for conventional variables explaining reserves
hoarding, that a one-dollar increase in international reserves by one
country was associated with an increase in reserves by the other nine of
about 60 cents. 
Exposure to latent domestic instability. To put Chinese policies in the
perspective of the historical development of East Asia, note that the his-
tory of Japan and Korea suggests the near absence of mercantilist hoard-
ing of international reserves during their phase of fast growth, and the
prevalence of export promotion by subsidizing heavily the cost of capital
in targeted sectors. This has been accomplished with the help of the state
banking system and occasionally with the tacit involvement of the cen-
tral bank. The legacy of subsidized capital has been a rapid increase in
M2 and the accumulation of nonperforming loans. Floundering eco-
nomic growth subsequently led to large hoarding of reserves in both
Japan (after 1992) and Korea (after 1997), probably both from mercan-
tilist motives and as self-insurance in view of the growing fragility of
their banking systems. These perspectives suggest that the recent mas-
sive hoarding of reserves by China may reflect a hybrid of mercantilist
and self-insurance motives.
14
Other explanations of reserves hoarding by China invoke political
economy considerations. The Chinese government faces multiple chal-
lenges: managing an economic take-off of unprecedented global magni-
tude, uncertainty regarding the political regime’s survival, growing
income disparities, a buildup of nonperforming loans, and growing
dependency on international trade. An abundance of savings in China
provides an opportunity to mitigate the risk of domestic instability by
aggressively hoarding international reserves, thereby reducing both the
risk of real exchange rate instability and the risk of inflation triggered by
domestic crisis.
15 This view is consistent with a 2006 report by Ernst &
13. Qian (2006).
14. See Aizenman and Lee (2006).
15. Arguably, if China were to face a banking crisis of the type experienced by
Argentina, a sizable cushion of international reserves would allow the authorities to avoid
the collapse of ﬁnancial intermediation and higher inﬂation that Argentina suffered.
Indeed, one could argue that the sheer size of Chinese international reserves may prevent a
run on its banking system in the ﬁrst place.
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Young that China’s nonperforming loans almost equaled its international
reserves.
16 It also suggests that, for countries averse to real exchange rate
volatility and inflation, actually usable international reserves may be
limited to what is left over after covering short-term external debt and
after any provisions for nonperforming loans in the domestic banking
system.
TESTING THE SELF-INSURANCE MODEL IN CHINA AND THE “PESO
PROBLEM.” Systematic attempts to test the self-insurance model are
challenged by a version of the “peso problem,” whereby current reserve
holdings appear inefficient given current conditions but may be justified
by expectations of future conditions. For example, the probability of a
deep crisis in China may be low, but the potential damage of such a cri-
sis may be immense. China’s take-off remains unique in terms of its
sheer size: China’s share of global GDP (adjusted for purchasing power
parity) tripled within just twenty-five years, from about 5 percent in 1977
to about 15 percent in 2003. This suggests that the experience of other
countries is of little help in determining China’s optimal level of
reserves. The econometric challenges associated with quantifying the
self-insurance needs of a country are akin to the challenge of quantifying
the optimal design of highways in the San Francisco Bay area. An unin-
formed tourist visiting San Francisco might conclude that highways
there are overbuilt and conjecture that San Franciscans have a strange
preference for heavily reinforced roads. Certainly the data of the last fif-
teen years do nothing to suggest otherwise. Only those who know the
city’s history, including the great earthquake of 1906, will understand why
highways there are designed the way they are, and indeed one may ask
why some highways remain underbuilt to this day. Similarly, although
China has been reasonably tranquil, economically and politically, during
the last twenty years, the region’s history during the twentieth century is
one of repeated “earthquakes,” some triggered domestically and some
abroad.
EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL. I close with several short comments on
possible extensions that may provide a better interpretation of the patterns
of hoarding in Latin America while also addressing some of the issues
involved in dealing with Asia. 
16. Jim Peterson, “Balance Sheet: China Offers Fertile Soil for Investor Unhappiness,”
International Herald Tribune, September 11, 2006.
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International reserves and sovereign default. The representative agent
model used by Jeanne is more appropriate to countries that, although
exposed to possible sudden stops and foreign currency crises, view the exter-
nal default option as too costly to be contemplated. (Korea during the last
thirty years is an example.) Understanding the role of international reserves
in Latin America, by contrast, requires modeling the implications of sover-
eign default for international reserves. As a practical matter, international
reserves are beyond creditors’ reach. This implies that, for countries willing
to contemplate it, sovereign default is an alternative, independent instrument
for consumption smoothing. Nancy Marion and I have provided a model and
some empirical evidence indicating that, in these circumstances, greater
political instability and polarization tend to reduce reserves hoarding and to
increase sovereign borrowing.
17 This interpretation may account for
Jeanne’s observation that, in 2000, Latin America held signiﬁcantly less
reserves than his benchmark model predicted.
Saving and reserves hoarding. With integration of national capital mar-
kets still limited, one expects that, all else equal, countries with higher sav-
ing rates would opt to hoard more reserves. Hence the same factors that
account for the large gap in saving rates between Latin America and East
Asia may also explain their different behaviors with respect to interna-
tional reserves. 
International reserves and the real exchange rate. Countries may hoard
reserves as a means of stabilizing the real exchange rate in the presence of
volatile terms of trade shocks and volatile short-term capital ﬂows.
18 This
argument is reinforced by Philippe Aghion and others, who found that real
exchange rate volatility reduces growth in countries with relatively weak
ﬁnancial development.
19 Hence factors that mitigate real exchange rate
volatility may be associated with superior economic performance. This is
of special relevance to commodity-exporting countries and countries with
shallow ﬁnancial systems. Extensions of Jeanne’s model that would allow
for adverse effects of real exchange rate volatility would imply another
rationale for hoarding reserves. 
Diversiﬁcation and agency problems. The lack of deeper diversiﬁcation
of international reserves may be partly due to agency problems. Central
17. Aizenman and Marion (2003).
18. See Aizenman (2006).
19. Aghion and others (2006).
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banks may be loss averse, in that the cost of holding too little reserves may
be much higher than the opportunity cost of holding too much.
20 If a cen-
tral bank’s loss aversion exceeds that of the representative consumer, a
good case can be made for putting some of the international reserves into a
“future generation” fund managed by the treasury or some other agency,
along the lines of Jeanne’s discussion. 
In conclusion, Jeanne’s paper is a ﬁrst-rate contribution to the debate
over the recent large buildup of international reserves in some countries.
The quest for a uniﬁed theory and empirical speciﬁcation of international
reserves holdings, although admirable, may not be feasible given the pace
of global change. It is constructive to view the observed patterns of inter-
national reserves hoarding as the aggregate result of several motives,
whose relative importance varies over time. Taking such an eclectic
approach, one may conjecture that the hoarding phenomenon has gone
through several phases. The ﬁrst phase, in the immediate aftermath of the
East Asian crisis, was dominated by countries seeking self-insurance
against exposure to foreign shocks. Countries stunned by the 1997 crisis
hedged their growing ﬁnancial integration by aggressively hoarding interna-
tional reserves. Yet, as Jeanne convincingly illustrates, the self-insurance
interpretation fails to account for the size of the reserves buildup in emerg-
ing market countries after 2000. My comments suggest that the levels of
reserve holdings observed recently indicate the turn to a second phase,
which may be better explained by competitive hoarding, by self-insurance
against latent domestic instability, and by exposure to instability associ-
ated with a growing weakness of commercial banks’ balance sheets. 
Lawrence H. Summers: Soon after I arrived at the Treasury as under secre-
tary of international affairs in 1993, I was briefed about the Exchange Stabi-
lization Fund. One of the ﬁrst questions I asked was why this fund, which
holds the foreign currency reserves that the Treasury uses to intervene in for-
eign exchange markets, was the size that it was. I received two answers. One
came from Treasury staff and consisted of a lengthy disquisition on the
series of historical events leading from the fund’s beginnings to date. The
other came from then–Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, who
explained how he and Edwin Truman, when Truman was on the staff of the
Federal Open Market Committee, had undertaken a research program to
20. Aizenman and Marion (2003).
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reported to me somewhat sheepishly their conclusion that, depending upon
certain assumptions that were difﬁcult to pin down, the optimal level was
somewhere between $20 billion and $2 trillion. So they had abandoned that
particular effort. 
I am glad to see Olivier Jeanne pick up the torch again and try to ana-
lyze the costs and beneﬁts of reserves and arrive at some concept of an
optimal level. And I broadly agree with his conclusions. I agree that it is
difﬁcult to account for the rise in reserves in East Asia on the basis of a
plausible precautionary hypothesis. I agree that those resources should be
invested in more imaginative ways, accepting more risk in exchange for a
higher return, than they are today. I agree that doing so will not likely
cause huge disruptions in the global capital market. And I agree that cur-
rent patterns of reserves holdings have something to do with mercantilism
on the part of the countries holding them. But I am somewhat more skepti-
cal of several aspects of Jeanne’s analysis. 
Let me ﬁrst make three points with respect to the cost-beneﬁt analysis
of reserves. The ﬁrst concerns possible nonlinearities. The basic proposi-
tion of any cost-beneﬁt analysis that seeks some optimum is that marginal
beneﬁt is equal to marginal cost. Unfortunately, in the case of reserves, it is
very difﬁcult to establish the shape of either the beneﬁt function or the cost
function. With respect to the use of reserves in crisis prevention, that is,
reducing the probability of a crisis, it is hard to demonstrate conclusively
that there are any statistically signiﬁcant beneﬁts at all. How those beneﬁts
vary for a given change in reserves when reserves are, say, two times
short-term debt versus four times short-term debt is even more difﬁcult to
estimate. Thus Jeanne’s results are heavily driven by his choice of func-
tional form. It would be worth experimenting with alternative, nonlinear
speciﬁcations, although I suspect it would be difﬁcult to gauge the results
with any precision. 
Second, Jeanne’s analysis requires certain assumptions about the me-
chanics not only of crisis prevention, but also of crisis mitigation, or how
reserves are to be used when a crisis actually happens. These assumptions
may not be appropriate. For example, the premise of the analysis using the
so-called sudden stop formulation, which looks at changes in the capital
account, is that the response to changes in the capital account is a change in
the holdings of reserves that maintains domestic absorption approximately
constant. Yet this is something that the International Monetary Fund, the
68 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
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institution for which Jeanne works, would never stand for. Rather, IMF
conditionality would typically not allow reserves to be used to permit
increased absorption but would instead insist that they be used for steril-
ized intervention—thereby reducing their efﬁcacy in maintaining level
output and consumption.
Third, I am not entirely persuaded by the cost side of the analysis. In a
perfect capital market, where all assets are perfect substitutes and reserves
are ﬁnanced by issuing domestic debt, holding reserves costs nothing at
all. Indeed, to the extent that domestic debt is issued to ﬁnance investment
in risky international assets to which the country’s citizens would not oth-
erwise have access, reserves are plausibly welfare enhancing. (The argu-
ment is similar to that made by Peter Diamond and others, that there is a
gain to investing a portion of the Social Security trust fund in equities.
1)
The costs of reserves accumulation, I think, lie in rather different areas
than those explored here: in the complexity posed for macroeconomic
management, and in the moral hazards for policymaking associated with
the availability of large amounts of reserves. Perhaps most important, the
costs of reserves lie in the consequences, when the assumption of perfect
substitutability of assets breaks down, of the (presumably transitory)
change in the real exchange rate that results from an intervention that
changes the relative supplies of assets. 
In short, I ﬁnd neither the paper’s analysis of costs nor its analysis of
beneﬁts entirely compelling, and therefore the paper’s comparison of opti-
mal with current levels of reserves does not seem to me the most persua-
sive approach to drawing inferences about the motives of countries that
hold large reserves. Perhaps a rather simpler approach is more revealing:
Was anyone worried in 2002 about inadequate reserves in the major coun-
tries at issue? No. Therefore, if reserves have increased severalfold since
then, it does not seem plausible to explain them on the basis of a precau-
tionary motive. To put it another way, does anyone believe that if China,
for example, could have maintained the same exchange rate path with half
as much reserves accumulation over the last three years, the Chinese
authorities would have been unhappy about it? If, as it seems to me, they
would not have been, the implication is fairly clear that China’s reserves
accumulation is an endogenous response to a decision not about the level
of reserves but about exchange rate policy. That decision may or may not,
1. Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003). 
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in a full domestic calculus, have been a wise one. But the simple facts of
the case—what China’s policymakers said they were doing, and what they
actually did—suggest that their accumulation of reserves was primarily a
consequence of their exchange rate policy decisions. And the same can
probably be said of the other East Asian countries.
If that is so, then the question of how to invest those reserves arises, and
here Jeanne and I are in complete agreement. I have argued for some time
that any reserves that the authorities do not envision using immediately
and proximately in a crisis could surely be invested in a more productive
vehicle than U.S. Treasury bills. Just as it would be ﬁnancial malpractice
for a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension fund to invest its reserves only in Treasury
bills, so it must be with respect to government reserves that have a very
long horizon. There are, as Jeanne recognizes, a variety of institutional
issues involved in managing reserves in a more aggressive way. But these
issues seem much smaller to me than in the case of investing the Social
Security trust fund in equities, because what is envisioned here is the exter-
nal investment of the reserves: to invest them domestically would compro-
mise the macroeconomic objectives associated with reserves management.
Since it is domestic investment that raises the most serious political issues,
investment of reserves raises fewer concerns. (This assumes that invest-
ments are portfolio investments made through asset management interme-
diaries rather than direct investments, which raise a number of complex
issues.)
The ﬁnal question that this discussion raises is about the international
surveillance mechanism. It is only a small exaggeration to say that, under
traditional international norms, if a country makes an inappropriate deci-
sion about how much money it is going to borrow from its own citizens,
that becomes a matter of great and urgent concern for the international
community and will be a focal point of IMF surveillance. If, on the other
hand, a country chooses to intervene in the foreign exchange market so as
to cause its exchange rate and its trade relations to be very different from
what they otherwise would have been, that, under current norms, is merely
a matter of the country’s choice of exchange rate regime and thus lies out-
side the purview of the IMF. Yet in a world where ﬂows of capital out of
many emerging market countries are large, to the extent those ﬂows reﬂect
not private investment decisions but rather conscious government policies
directed at moving exchange rates in a particular direction, those decisions
are surely an appropriate object of international surveillance and discus-
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sion. I hope that the recently debated reforms in IMF surveillance policy
will redress this concern.
So, although I appreciate Jeanne’s arguments, which are surely correct,
that there are many countries that are not accumulating excessive reserves,
and that reserves can be appropriately used for collective insurance, it
seems to me there is a much larger issue at stake. That is whether some-
thing that is presumptively a nonmarket outcome, namely, a public deci-
sion to pursue intervention policies to cause exchange rates to differ from
what market forces would determine, should be the subject of a more
active discussion among the international community, led by the IMF.
That it should be seems the most obvious implication of this research for
IMF policy. As I said at the outset, it is enormously difﬁcult to construct
careful and rigorous models that will yield precise conclusions on these
matters, and I have some questions about the particular model presented
here. Nonetheless I think this is a very valuable undertaking that will even-
tually help us understand what I think is a major new feature of the inter-
national ﬁnancial system, and for that we can be very grateful.
General discussion: Richard Cooper reminded the panel that in the 1960s
there had been a lively literature on the optimum level of reserve holdings.
He reported, however, that he had never met an ofﬁcial who thought in
terms of optimal reserves; it should not be surprising, then, that reserves
accumulation in many developing economies is not in accord with the nor-
mative prescriptions of Olivier Jeanne’s model. Cooper suggested that, in
order to understand the large international reserves in emerging market
countries, one could simply refer to the main lesson that came out of the
ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s: do not run a current account deﬁcit that is
ﬁnanced by private capital inﬂows. If the ofﬁcials of such countries have
indeed learned this lesson, they will have targeted a balanced current
account and should therefore, in the buoyant world economy of recent
years, ﬁnd themselves with a current account surplus and growing
reserves. Reserves accumulation, in other words, has been a by-product of
other policies. Of course, when reserves fall uncomfortably low, ofﬁcials
will target an increase, but one should not worry too much if reserves
exceed their notional target.
Cooper agreed with the paper’s conclusion that the reserves of some
Asian countries exceed what can be justiﬁed on a precautionary basis, but
also with the paper’s observation that most of these countries are slowly
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moving funds out of central bank reserves and into so-called sovereign
wealth accounts. China, for example, is considering creating a $200 bil-
lion overseas investment fund to improve the return on its assets. Most of
the ofﬁcial investment funds that already exist are small, Norway’s being
the largest. Cooper asserted that the consequences of a world ﬁnancial
market in which some of the major investors are ofﬁcial investment funds
with assets on the scale of $100 billion or $200 billion, and the rules that
will govern the investment of such funds, are important topics for future
analysis. 
Cooper noted that the extraordinarily rapid aging of some East Asian
societies suggests a reason for reserves accumulation that was missing
from Jeanne’s analysis. These societies are eventually going to have to rely
on foreign assets to maintain their consumption. Ideally, the private resi-
dents of those countries would be permitted to invest abroad, and they
would surely do so if permitted. But except in Hong Kong, institutional
and information constraints are strong deterrents. This situation will un-
doubtedly change eventually, but for the time being Asian central banks
are effectively acting as a nonoptimizing intermediary in their citizens’
foreign investment.
Replying to Lawrence Summers’ point regarding the rationale for the
current size of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund, Cooper noted
that the fund is a historical legacy, determined by gold proﬁts and the U.S.
revaluation of the price of gold in the 1930s; there was no optimization
involved at all. 
Raghuram Rajan, echoing Cooper’s remarks, agreed that in countries
with severe restrictions on private capital ﬂows the central bank’s actions
substitute for what would otherwise be private outﬂows. The question is
how rapidly to remove the restrictions that today create distortions in sav-
ing and investment. He suggested that central banks’ perception of the
risks that accompany removal of restrictions on private transactions
inhibits reform. The People’s Bank of China, for example, is worried about
the magnitude of private outﬂows that would result from relaxing its capi-
tal controls. In particular, given the poor quality of China’s banking sys-
tem, and given that the ratio of bank credit to GDP is well over 100 per-
cent, one might reasonably expect a tremendous outﬂow of capital from
China in the absence of controls. One mechanism that would allow for
measured increases in private capital outﬂows would be for the central
bank to set up a closed-end investment fund that is allowed to invest in for-
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eign assets while maintaining control over the number of shares sold to
domestic investors.
Eswar Prasad stressed the potential costs to a developing economy of an
undervalued currency. In China, for example, the ﬁnancial repression that
results from undervaluation dictates a ceiling on deposit rates of about 
3 percent, which, with inﬂation at comparable levels, amounts to a zero real
rate of return. He suggested that it would be useful to know, in the context
of Jeanne’s model, how reserves accumulation affects the domestic rate of
interest, providing an indication of the potential costs of ﬁnancial repres-
sion implicit in accumulating reserves. He observed that because these
costs of repression are largely hidden, spread throughout the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, the political system is likely to be biased toward undervaluation, with
its more visible beneﬁts for export growth. And he suggested that the costs
of repression need to be taken into account when considering a build-up of
reserves for other purposes that have been suggested, such as bank recapi-
talization or the accumulation of foreign assets to cover the needs of an
aging society. 
In a different vein, Prasad suggested that Jeanne’s model overlooked
the distributional effects of crises. These effects can have a substantial
social cost. Even when a crisis is not large in terms of GDP, the distribu-
tional effects can still be enormous. In an economy like China, with a large
number of unemployed, both disguised and undisguised, any disturbance
could push people over the edge, setting off political and social instability.
The Chinese authorities care a lot more about this cost than about the cost
to output.
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